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Abstract
Emerging smart grids consist of tightly-coupled systems, namely a power grid and
a communication system. While today’s power grids are highly reliable and modern control and communication systems have been deployed to further enhance their
reliability, historical data suggest that they are yet vulnerable to large failures. A
small set of initial disturbances in power grids in conjunction with lack of effective,
corrective actions in a timely manner can trigger a sequence of dependent component
failures, called cascading failures. The main thrust of this dissertation is to build
a probabilistic framework for modeling cascading failures in power grids while capturing their interactions with the coupled communication systems so that the risk
of cascading failures in the composite complex electric-cyber infrastructures can be
examined, analyzed and predicted.
A scalable and analytically tractable continuous-time Markov chain model for
stochastic dynamics of cascading failures in power grids is constructed while retain-
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ing key physical attributes and operating characteristics of the power grid. The key
idea of the proposed framework is to simplify the state space of the complex power
system while capturing the effects of the omitted variables through the transition
probabilities and their parametric dependence on physical attributes and operating characteristics of the system. In particular, the effects of the interdependencies
between the power grid and the communication system have been captured by a parametric formulation of the transition probabilities using Monte-Carlo simulations of
cascading failures. The cascading failures are simulated with a coupled power-system
simulation framework, which is also developed in this dissertation. Specifically, the
probabilistic model enables the prediction of the evolution of the blackout probability
in time. Furthermore, the asymptotic analysis of the blackout probability enables
the calculation of the probability mass function of the blackout size, which has been
shown to have a heavy tail, e.g., power-law distribution, specifically when the grid
is operating under stress scenarios. A key benefit of the model is that it enables the
characterization of the severity of cascading failures in terms of a set of operating
characteristics of the power grid. As a generalization to the Markov chain model, a
regeneration-based model for cascading failures is also developed. The regenerationbased framework is capable of modeling cascading failures in a more general setting
where the probability distribution of events in the system follows an arbitrarily specified distribution with non-Markovian characteristics.
Further, a novel interdependent Markov chain model is developed, which provides
a general probabilistic framework for capturing the effects of interactions among interdependent infrastructures on cascading failures. A key insight obtained from this
model is that interdependencies between two systems can make two individually
reliable systems behave unreliably. In particular, we show that due to the interdependencies two chains with non-heavy tail asymptotic failure distribution can result
in a heavy tail distribution when coupled.

vii

Lastly, another aspect of future smart grids is studied by characterizing the fundamental bounds on the information rate in the sensor network that monitors the power
grid. Specifically, a distributed source coding framework is presented that enables
an improved estimate of the lower bound for the minimum required communication
capacity to accurately describe the state of components in the information-centric
power grid.
The models developed in this dissertation provide critical understanding of cascading failures in electric-cyber infrastructures and facilitate reliable and quick detection of the risk of blackouts and precursors to cascading failures. These capabilities
can guide the design of efficient communication systems and cascade-aware control
policies for future smart grids.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Overview and motivation

A collection of systems are said to be interdependent if the behavior of a system
affects the other systems’ behavior. Many critical infrastructures are interdependent
systems, wherein the reliability of each system affects the reliability of other systems. Examples of such interdependent infrastructures are power, communication,
transportation, and financial market infrastructures. Reliable operation of critical
infrastructures is essential as it impacts national security and the economy. Due to
the importance of critical infrastructures it is important to develop frameworks for
accurate prediction of their reliability and complex behavior. However, complexity
and scale of critical infrastructures as well as their interdependencies make modeling
and analysis of such systems challenging. Many proposed frameworks for reliability
analysis of critical interdependent infrastructures consider infrastructures individually, while emerging efforts consider interdependent infrastructures jointly as a single
system.
In this dissertation, the critical infrastructures under study are power and com-
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munication infrastructures. While power grids are currently highly reliable, historical
data suggest that their complex nature, aging, growing demands, operation near their
limits, as well as lack of infrastructure investment make them vulnerable to intermittent failures. When such systems become stressed due to a small set of initial
disturbances a sequence of dependent component failures may occur in the system.
Such sequence of dependent failures is called cascading failures. As stated in [3],
historical data indicate that many blackouts in power grids result from cascading
failures. Specifically, cascading failures in power grids has gained much attention
due to their cost and large impact on society. For instance, the 2003 blackout in
the Northeast grid of the United States led to electrical service interruption to approximately 50 million people in eight US states and one Canadian province [2].
Also, the 2003 blackout in Italy affected approximately 57 million people in Italy
and Switzerland [6].

Figure 1.1: A power-law scaling of blackout frequency based on the historical data. Blackout size is measured by unserved energy (the figure is a copy borrowed from [1].)

Although severe infrastructure disruptions such as large blackouts are rare, new
findings suggest that their probability is higher than what traditional risk analysis
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predicts [1, 7]. Moreover, moderate size cascading failures (interruption of service
to 50,000 customers or less) are surprisingly common according to [3]. Generally,
a power-law scaling of blackout frequency has been observed, as shown in Fig. 1.1
from [1], based on the available historical data, when the blackout size is measured
by unserved energy. The power-law behavior in the distribution of the blackout size
suggests that the probability of large blackouts are larger than what can be ignored.
Therefore, it is important to analyze the risk and probability of large blackouts in
power grids.
Large cascading failures in the transmission grid of power grids can be triggered
by a combination of a small set of initial failures and lack of proper corrective actions in a timely manner. Power grids are usually operated so that a single failure
of one of the most critical components can be absorbed without cascading failures
(N-1 Criterion). The ability of the grid to operate in this fashion is linked to the
integrity of the sensing and communication systems, as well as to the ability of the
monitoring tools to convey accurate information to human operators and automatic
control systems, which are ultimately responsible for corrective actions such as load
shedding. As we move toward smarter power grids, power grids rely more and more
on the modern control and communication technologies to improve their reliability
and efficiency. However, these gains come with their own vulnerabilities, since the
correct functioning of the power grid depends not only on the integrity of the power
infrastructure but also on the effectiveness of the communication system. Vulnerabilities associated with communication systems, such as physical component failures,
cyber attacks and communication-protocol inefficiencies, can threaten the reliability
of power grids specially when they are stressed. Historical data also suggest that
power and communication infrastructures are interdependent and the reliability of
one affects the reliability of the other. For instance, in the 2003 blackout in Italy on
September 28th, unplanned shutdown of a power station led to failures of communication network nodes and the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
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system, which were responsible for controlling the power grid. This event, in turn,
led to further failures in the power grid resulting in a large cascading-failure event in
the system [8]. Another example of such interdependency is observable in the 2003
blackout in the Northeast United States, where not only power-component failures
contributed to cascading failures so did the computer and human events. Figure 1.2
presents the timeline of initial power, computer and human events at the start of the
2003 blackout in Ohio [2]. Here, a mishandled restart of a monitoring system led to
a sequence of undetected failures. Subsequent corrective actions, such as load shedding, were also delayed as the operator had never seen requests of such a magnitude
and was unaware of the rapidly developing crisis. As such, miscommunication and
failures in the control and monitoring systems fueled the cascade of failures leading to a large blackout. In summary, interdependencies and extensive integration of
power grids and communication systems mandate that they should be studied as a
single electric-cyber system specially when the reliability of the system is of concern.
Another important lesson to be learned from the past events is that human error also
plays an important role in the cascading behavior of the system. Although it has not
been explored in this dissertation, human-behavioral aspects of cascading failures
such as the level of stress and panic, and operators susceptibility to errors are also
key components to be investigated in the reliability of electric-cyber infrastructures.
Our research group at the University of New Mexico in collaboration with Fraunhofer
USA Center for Sustainable Energy Systems is currently working on modeling the
behavior of the power-grid operators and its impact on cascading failures.
Another important point regarding cascading failures is that the time evolution
of failures exhibits three phases. The first phase of cascading failures is the precursor
phase, where the progress of failures is slow and the control actions are effective to
mitigate the effects of disturbances. The second phase of cascading failures is the escalation phase, where failures occur very fast and preventing blackouts in this phase
is very difficult. The third phase of cascading failures is cascade phase out, where the
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Figure 1.2: The timeline of initial power, computer and human events at the start of the
2003 blackout in Ohio (the figure is a copy borrowed from [2].)

progress of failures becomes slow again. This behavior can be attributed to the fact
that a large number of components have already failed and functional islands have
formed in the system leading to the termination of cascading failures. These three
phases are easily observable in the time evolution of failures in the 2003 blackout
shown in Fig. 1.3. Clearly, the ability to reliably and quickly detect precursors to
cascading failures before the system enters the escalation phase, combined with fast
and correct responses are crucial for mitigating large blackouts. Hence, it is important to build predictive tools that can identify the risk of large cascading failures in
integrated power and communication infrastructures.
Nowadays, operators have become more adept at operating the grid near its physical limits by taking advantage of advances in communications and data processing.
In particular, advances in sensor technologies have accelerated the use of sensors
for continuously monitoring components of critical infrastructures. The employed
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Figure 1.3: Time evolution of failure accumulation in the 2003 blackout in Northeast United
States power grid (the figure is a copy borrowed from [2].)

sensors take samples of the status of components with high frequency and send the
status updates to control centers, enabling them to accurately estimate the state of
the system. As such, smart grids of the future will face large volume of data, which
must be handled efficiently by provisioning necessary computation and communication resources.
The size of customer demands, available generation resources, and the status of
the control and communication system determine the operating setting of the power
grid. The operating setting can largely affect the resilience of the system in the
case of contingencies. In general, cascading failures in power grids are particularly
complex phenomena as they are attributable to a large number of interacting factors
and stochastic events. It is essential to develop theoretical frameworks driven by the
need to abstract and better understand such complex phenomena in such complex
systems. The fundamental understanding of cascading behaviors guides the design
of control policies for power grids as well as reliable communication networks for
robustness of the power grid. It is also crucial to characterize the severity of cascading
failures in terms of the operating characteristics of the power grid to avoid operating
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modes that increase the probability of large blackouts. Specifically, understanding
cascading failures in interdependent infrastructures is significantly important as the
interdependency between infrastructures can result in new behaviors for the whole
system as a single system, which are not observable in the individual systems.

1.2
1.2.1

Literature review
Prior work on modeling cascading failures in power
grids

In the past two decades, a great volume of work has been devoted to understanding
and analyzing cascading failures. The majority of research in cascading failures in
power grids has been focused on single, non-interacting power systems. A review of
different available methods for analyzing cascading failures in power grids is provided
in [9]. These efforts can be categorized into three classes: analysis of cascading
failures using power-system simulations [10], deterministic analytical models [11–13],
and probabilistic analytical models [5, 14–18]. Each approach sheds light on certain
aspects of cascading failures with various degrees of detail and complexity.
Many of the approaches that are based on power-system simulations use static
line overloads with DC power flow model [10]. In simulation-based approaches there
is a trade-off between complexity and simulation time, on one hand, and details and
diverse scenarios that the simulator can simulate on the other hand.
In the category of deterministic approaches, the work in [12] presents a model
for cascading failures in complex networks. This work is motivated in part by the
propagation of failures and congestion in computer networks. The presented model
for communication networks differs from power-grid models in that it considers flows
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of fully controlled discrete packets of information, rather than flow of electricity in the
power grid. Another example of the deterministic model is a hybrid nonlinear system
model using Lyapunov methods that is proposed by DeMarco in [11] to determine
cascading failures due to dynamic transients in the system. In this work a detailed
RLC circuit model is used as an example to illustrate the concept of cascading failures
in the context of RLC circuits (electrical circuits consisting of resistors, inductors,
and capacitors). Some limitations of the deterministic approaches are their inability
to capture the effects of stochastic events that may affect cascading failures and the
complexity and scalability limitations to large systems.
Probabilistic models for cascading failures can elegantly capture the stochastic
dynamics of cascading failures as well as the general qualitative features of cascading
failures such as the risk of blackout, probability distribution of the blackout size and
the asymptotic behavior of cascading failures in certain cases. In this dissertation,
we focus on the probabilistic approaches for cascading failures in power grids. The
CASCADE model by Dobson et al. [14] models cascading failures triggered by initial
load increments on certain components of the system. In this model, failures occur
due to overloaded components and cascading failures develop as a result of redistribution of loads among the remaining components. However, the re-distribution of
loads are based upon simple assumptions; for example, loads will be added equally
to the components of the system as a result of failures. The CASCADE model is a
simple and analytically tractable model; however, it does not consider the topological
or electrical characteristics of power grids and heterogeneity of capacity of components. Probabilistic analytical models based upon branching processes [5, 19, 20]
have also emerged, providing a framework to study the statistical properties of cascading failures such as the probability distribution of the blackout size. Reported
branching-process approaches model cascading failures by considering generations of
failures, whereby each failure in each generation independently produces a random
number of subsequent failures in the next generation, and so on. In [19, 20], the
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authors estimate the failure generation parameter of the branching process model
for cascading failures using historical outage datasets. Notably, in [20] the authors
account for varying failure generation parameter as the cascade progresses instead of
a fixed parameter as in [19]. However, authors in [20] assume that all line outages
are homogeneous in their type. The models presented based on branching process
have the limitation that they do not have sufficient degree of freedom to capture the
effect of physical factors contributing to cascading failures, as the failure generation
parameter is the only parameter used in these models.
Finally, the recent work by Wang et al. [17] provides a Markov-transition model
for cascading failures. The transition probabilities among states are derived from
a stochastic model for line overloading using a stochastic flow redistribution model
based upon DC power-flow equations. The state space of the model [17] is large, as it
requires tracking the functionality status of transmission lines and power flow information. This model enables simulating the progression of cascading failures and its
time span. However, due to the analytical complexity of the time-varying transition
probabilities the analytical and asymptotic characterization of probabilistic metrics
such as the blackout probability and distribution of the blackout size is not possible.

1.2.2

Prior work on modeling cascading failures in interdependent infrastructures

Aside from efforts on understanding the reliability of individual infrastructures, there
has been great interest in understanding cascading failures in interdependent infrastructures. The general concepts of interdependent infrastructures and challenges in
modeling such systems have been discussed in [21–25]. We categorize the efforts for
modeling cascading failures in interdependent infrastructures into three classes as
described bellow.
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Graph-based models – A body of work has emerged recently in understanding
cascading failures in interdependent infrastructures using network theory and graphbased models. These efforts use network-theoretic tools to characterize cascading
failures based on network properties and to identify vulnerable areas of the network.
In such efforts, a problem that has been considered is the characterization of the
minimum number of nodes/links whose removal will disrupt the functionality of the
entire network [8, 26–30]. For instance, the work of Buldyrev et al. [31] considers
a graph-based approach that utilizes percolation theory. The authors provide analytical solutions for the critical fraction of nodes that on their removal will lead to
cascading failures and to a complete fragmentation of two interdependent networks.
Later, Li et al. [32] extended the work to include geographical factors in the coupling between interdependent networks, such as considering the range of interaction
between nodes from different networks. Further, the work in [33] by Wang et al.
extended the work in [31] by taking into account the load, the load redistribution,
and the node capacity in studying the robustness of two interdependent networks.
In general, the graph-based models do not consider the physics of the system and
they only rely on the topological connectivity of the system in their analysis.
Hybrid simulations – These approaches aim to build accurate synchronization
mechanisms between the simulators of the two systems. As mentioned before, in
simulation-based approaches there is a trade-off between complexity and simulation
time, on one hand, and details and diverse scenarios that the simulator can simulate
on the other hand. The extra challenge for the hybrid power and communication
simulation is the synchronization of the continuous time power-system simulators
with the discrete-event communication-system simulators. Examples of such efforts
are [34–36]. The work in [37] is another example that aims to develop a simulation framework which abstracts the physical details of the services provided by the
infrastructures while at the same time capturing their essential operating features.
A group of efforts in this category are the approaches that focus on a specific ef-
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fect of the control and communication system on the power grid and model the
effects directly in the power-grid dynamics and equations. We call such approaches,
effect-driven models. An example of such models is [38], where the role of information exchange is investigated in the transient stability of generators and the loss of
generator synchronism in power grids.
Probabilistic models – Probabilistic analysis of the reliability of interdependent
systems is another category of modeling cascading failures in interdependent infrastructures. The goal of these efforts is to investigate the risk of large failures as a
result of interdependencies among the systems. For instance, the authors in [39, 40]
introduced the Damon model in conjunction with a mean-field theory to model coupled infrastructure systems. This work suggests that the coupling between systems
can make the whole system vulnerable and increase the probability of large failures.
There are some intersections between the approaches in this category with the graphbased models in using probabilistic models, for instance the work by Brummitt et
al. [41] characterizes the optimal connectivity between two interdependent networks
while using the multitype branching process framework.

1.3

Contributions of this dissertation

The main thrust of this dissertation is to build a predictive capability of the reliability of a power grid while considering its interdependency with a communication
system. While the majority of the work in this dissertation has been presented for
power grids and communication systems, key general ideas can be applied to different
interdependent infrastructures. We summaries the contributions of this dissertation
as follows.
The first contribution of this dissertation is the development of a scalable probabilistic framework for modeling cascading failures in power grids. The key idea of the
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proposed framework is to simplify the state space of the complex power system so
that we can track the dynamics of cascading failures using a continuous-time Markov
chain while capturing the effects of the omitted variables through the transition probabilities and their parametric dependence on the physical attributes and operating
characteristics of the system. In addition to the framework’s ability to predict the
evolution of blackout probability in time, the asymptotic analysis of the blackout
probability using this model enables the calculation of the probability mass function
of the blackout size and leads to the characterization of the severity of cascading failures under different system operating characteristics. A key insight provided by this
framework is that the probability distribution of size of failures in power grids has a
heavy tail, which the probability of large blackouts heavily depends on the operating
characteristics of the power grid. The ability to characterize the distribution of the
blackout size in terms of the physical attributes and operating characteristics of the
system while keeping the complexity to a minimum is a critical advantage of this
approach. Other probabilistic approaches [14, 42–45] often lack a strong connection
to the physical characteristics of power grids.
The second contribution of this dissertation is a generalization of the Markov
chain model to another probabilistic framework for modeling cascading failures based
on regeneration theory. Similarly to the Markov chain model, this model provides
a strong tool for capturing the stochastic dynamics of cascading failures, albeit in a
more general setting, namely non-Markovian setting. We derive, as a special case, a
systems of differential equations describing the probability of the blackout for a power
grid with Markovian setting using the regeneration-based framework. The analysis
of this model supplements the analysis of the Markov chain model for cascading
failures.
The third contribution of this dissertation is an extension of the Markov chain
model to a novel interdependent Markov chain framework for modeling cascading
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failures in interdependent infrastructures. To the best of the author’s knowledge, interdependent Markov chains have not been proposed heretofore. The interdependent
Markov chain approach proposed in this dissertation provides a probabilistic framework to capture how the stochastic dynamics of a system affects the other system’s
dynamics. The idea of this general approach is to build an integrated framework
consisting of a system of interdependent heterogeneous Markov chains, one for each
physical system. The usual approach for coupling Markov chains relies on the generation of the Cartesian product of the individual state spaces. This approach, however,
has the shortcoming that the new transition probabilities among the states of the
coupled Markov chain cannot be readily derived from the transition probabilities of
the individual Markov chains. A more serious flaw of this approach is that it is based
on the false and built-in assumption that combining two Markov chains results in a
new Markov chain with its state space being the Cartesian product of the individual chains. To address these issues, we have proposed the interdependent Markov
chain framework with an interleaving approach for coupling Markov chains. Meanwhile, the similar term “interactive Markov chains” [46], describes models which
fall in the category of process algebra frameworks [47]. Interactive Markov chains
have been introduced as a framework for analyzing concurrent systems. Generally,
process algebras are abstract languages that are used to model concurrent systems
as collections of entities, called agents, to describe their behaviors as well as how
they communicate [48]. In these models, agents communicate by actions. The interactive Markov chain framework combines interacting agents each described by a
continuous-time Markov chain by extending the standard Markov chains with action transitions and forming a stochastic process algebra framework. While these
models along with an algorithm to analyze the interactions and dependencies among
agents are applicable for performance analysis of systems with large number of simple
agents, the complexity of the models as well as the agents increases for cases with
few interacting complex systems (few very complex agents). Moreover, they do not
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provide a standard probabilistic framework with its standard analytical tools. The
interdependent Markov chain model presented in this dissertation enables us to characterize the impact of stochastic behavior of a system on its interdependent systems
in a probabilistic framework. A key insight obtained from interdependent Markov
chain framework is that interdependencies between two systems can make two reliable systems behave unreliably when they are put together, thereby increasing the
probability of large failures.
The fourth contribution of this dissertation is developing a simulation framework
for simulating cascading failures in electric-cyber infrastructures. Monte-Carlo simulations using this framework is used in parametric modeling of transition rates of the
models for cascading failures presented in this dissertation. The proposed simulation framework is based on an integrated power-flow optimization framework, which
captures certain effects of communication-system vulnerabilities in the power-flow
distribution of the system. This optimization framework enables us to investigate
the effects of communication vulnerabilities as well as the topology of the communication system on the reliability of the power grid.
The fifth contribution of this dissertation is developing a simulation framework
that enables a systematic way of simulating correlated failures. Generally, physical infrastructures are vulnerable to spatially correlated failures arising from various
physical stresses such as natural disasters (earthquakes and hurricanes) as well as
malicious coordinated attacks. It is important to study the effects of spatial distribution of failures on cascading failures. As such, we present a stochastic model,
based on spatial point processes, for representing stress centers on the geographical
plane in order to facilitate the modeling and simulation of spatially inhomogeneous
and correlated component failures in the system. This model is then used to further
generate scenarios with inhibition or clustering between stress centers, which enables
detailed assessment of vulnerabilities of the system to the level of inhomogeneity and
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spatial correlation in the stress-event centers. This simulation framework enables
us to study the effects of spatial correlation of initial failures in communication and
power systems on cascading failures.
The sixth major contribution of this dissertation is developing an informationtheoretic framework for characterizing the information rate of the sensor network
that monitors the power grid to enhance its reliability. Due to the large number of
sensors and the high frequency of sampling from the states of components, exchange
of state information incurs a large communication cost on the communication system
of the power grid. To characterize the minimum required information rate in the
communication system, a lossless distributed source-coding framework is presented to
model the exchange of state information. The framework enables the characterization
of the interplay between the information rate and the correlation among the state
information of various components. Moreover, the proposed framework enables an
improved estimate of the lower bound for the minimum information rate necessary
to accurately describe the state of components in the system. This improvement is
achieved by exploiting the correlation among the state information of components
as well as the available side information in the system.
In Fig. 1.4, we have summarized the contributions of this dissertation in a flow
chart that shows the basic dependencies between the contributions.

1.4

Organization of the dissertation

For the convenience of the reader, whenever appropriate, the chapters provide concise
review of the relevant background information and related work, as well as brief
summary and our conclusions.
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, the structure of electric-
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Figure 1.4: The flow chart of the basic dependencies between the contributions of this
dissertation. The arrows point at the dependent contribution. The solid line represents
the direct dependency between the contributions. This means certain parts of the model
or the theory is used in the other contribution. The dashed line represents an indirect
dependency, which means certain concepts are borrowed from the other contribution.

cyber infrastructures is reviewed. The general assumptions made about the interdependency of power grids and communication systems are stated and the interdependency parameters used in our models are introduced. In addition, the power-flow
optimization framework that captures the interdependency between the power grid
and the communication system and enables the simulation of cascading failures in
power grids is presented. The simulation results that show the impact of interdependencies on the reliability of the power grid are also presented. Further, the effects of
the connectivity of the communication system on the reliability of the communication
system and the power grid is investigated.
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The focus of Chapter 3 is on characterizing the effects of spatial distribution of
initial failures on the reliability of communication and power systems. A probabilistic
model for modeling correlated failures is provided that enables a systematic way of
simulating correlated failures. Various scenarios of correlated initial failures in the
communication system and their effects on the reliability of the power grid have been
investigated.
In Chapter 4, a continuous-time Markov chain framework, termed Stochastic
Abstract State Evolution (SASE), for modeling cascading failures in power grids is
presented. The concept of equivalence classes for partitioning the state space of the
power grid is introduced. The transition rates of the Markov chain capturing the
effects of communication interdependencies and operating characteristics are formulated using the power-system simulations. The analytical results on the size and
severity of cascading failures have been presented for various operating conditions.
Finally, the conditions leading to a power-law behavior for the distribution of the
blackout size in power grids are studied.
In Chapter 5, a regeneration-based approach for modeling cascading failures in
power grids is presented. The integral equations describing the evolution of the
blackout distribution are derived using the regeneration-based framework.
In Chapter 6, the problem of modeling cascading failures in interdependent infrastructures is formulated by extending the the Markov chain framework to an
interdependent Markov chain framework. The general interdependent Markov chain
approach for modeling any number of interdependent system is presented. As a specific example, the interdependent Markov chain model for power and communication
infrastructures is developed.
In Chapter 7, the minimum requirement for the capacity of the communication
network for tracking accurate information on the state of components in power grids
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is characterized. A lossless, distributed source-coding framework is presented to
model the exchange of state information. An improved estimate of the lower bound
for the minimum information rate of the communication system is also derived.
Finally, in Chapter 8 possible new lines of research for this work in the future
have been discussed.

1.5

Publications resulting from the dissertation

A list of our publications, related to this dissertation, is as follows:
1. M. Rahnamay-Naeini, and M. M. Hayat, “Stochastic Dynamics of Cascading
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Approach”, To be submitted, 2014.
2. M. Rahnamay-Naeini, and M. M. Hayat, “On the Influences of Power-Grid Operating Characteristics on Self-Organized Criticality”, To be submitted, 2014.
3. M. Rahnamay-Naeini, Z. Wang, N. Ghani, A. Mammoli, and M. M. Hayat,
“Stochastic Analysis of Cascading-Failure Dynamics in Power Grids”, IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. PP, no. 99, 2014.
4. M. Rahnamay-Naeini and M. M. Hayat, “On the Role of Power-Grid and
Communication-System Interdependencies on Cascading Failures”, Proceedings
of IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, pp. 527-530,
2013.
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8. M. Rahnamay-Naeini, Jorge E. Pezoa, Ghady Azar, Nasir Ghani, Majeed M.
Hayat, “Modeling Stochastic Correlated Failures and their Effects on Network
Reliability”, Proceedings of 20th International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN), pp. 1-6, Maui, Hawaii, August 2011.
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Chapter 2
Interdependent electric and cyber
infrastructures
In this chapter, we start by briefly reviewing the structure of the electric-cyber
infrastructure. We then develop a simulation framework that enables simulating
cascading failures in an electric-cyber infrastructure. To do so, we first introduce
the overloading and failure mechanisms assumed in this dissertation for modeling
cascading failures. Next, we review the general sources of interdependency among
critical infrastructures and state the assumptions made about the interdependency
of power grids and communication systems that lead to propagation of failures between the two systems. Based on these assumptions, we introduce interdependency
parameters that will be used in our models. Further, the power-flow optimization
framework that captures the interdependency between the power grid and the communication system is presented based on the general DC power-flow optimization
framework [49]. Using this optimization framework, we simulate cascading failures
and study the extent to which the interdependency between the two systems affects
the reliability of the coupled system. We show that as the level of interdependency
between the two systems increases the frequency of failures in the individual systems
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increases and severe cascading behavior occurs. The simulation framework proposed
in this chapter will be used for Monte-Carlo simulations of cascading failures and
estimating the parameters of the model presented in Chapter 4.

2.1

Structure of the electric-cyber infrastructure

A power grid is an interconnected network that delivers electricity from generation
resources to consumers. In general, power grids consist of distribution and transmission networks. The transmission network transmits electricity over long distances.
We describe the transmission network as a set of nodes interconnected by highvoltage transmission lines. In the transmission network, network nodes represent
load buses L (substations, which are connected to distribution network), generating
stations G, combinations of load and generating buses, and transmission buses that
do not have any load or generating resources and only help in transmitting power
in the transmission network. At a substation, the power is stepped down from a
transmission level voltage to a distribution level voltage and is delivered to individual customers by distribution lines. Figure 2.1 depicts the schematics of distribution
and transmission networks. As large blackouts and cascading failures are attributes
of the transmission network, we focus on the transmission network of power grids in
this dissertation. We use IEEE 118 bus system (Fig. 2.2) and IEEE 300 bus system (Fig. 2.3) as two examples of transmission networks for simulation and analysis
purposes.
Power grids rely on their control and communication systems for efficient and
reliable daily operations. The control and communication systems of power grids are
hierarchical systems (see Fig. 2.1). For instance, in the distribution-network level,
neighbor area networks (NAN) provide network connectivity to endpoints such as
smart meters deployed at customer homes and businesses. At the next level of the
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Figure 2.1: A balancing authority (BA) consisting of a transmission network and two
distribution networks along with their control and communicating systems. The electriccyber infrastructures have hierarchical structures.

Figure 2.2: Topology of the IEEE 118 bus system. The control center for this transmission
network is assumed to be co-located with the node marked by the circle.

hierarchy, wide area networks (WAN) connect multiple NANs to the control centers
at the distribution-network level for monitoring and control purposes. Another level
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Figure 2.3: Topology of the IEEE 300 bus system. The topology is plotted based on the
topology map from [3].

of the hierarchy is at the transmission-network level, where sensors, phasor measurement unit (PMU), phasor data concentrators (PDC), and protective relays connect
through a wide area monitoring network that communicates the state information of
transmission-network components to the control center at the transmission-network
level. The control centers employ, for example, SCADA, energy management system
(EMS), or distributed management system (DMS) to control and monitor the system
using the information provided by the communication system.
Considerable efforts have emerged in studying smart-grid communications. A
large subset of such efforts emphasize only on the communication network for the
distribution level of power grids [50]. Communication networks for the transmission
network of power grids have been studied in [51]. This work introduces critical attributes and technology solutions that can be employed at the transmission network
level. Depending on the technology solutions and how they have been employed, the
communication network may have different topologies. One possible network topol-
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ogy for the communication system of the transmission grid is the same topology as
the transmission grid itself, which we call such topology the base topology. The base
topology is a communication topology with a node at each bus and communication
links along transmission lines. This topology may be formed, for example, by employment of optical ground wires (OPGW) along transmission lines of the power
grid.
Overall, the regional transmission sub-systems in power grids controlled by the
same entity are called balancing authority (BA). For instance, Fig. 2.1 represents a
BA. Each BA has a primary control center (and a set of backup control centers) responsible for maintaining the stability of the region. The control center monitors the
system, for instance, by employing SCADA systems, and makes control decisions for
the BA. Such decisions are, for example, about integrating and planning generation
resources and finding solutions to the optimal power-flow distribution for the transmission network. Multiple BAs form a reliability coordinator region as is shown in
Fig. 2.4 and finally multiple reliability coordinator regions form an interconnection,
where, for example, the electrical infrastructure of the United States is composed of
three interconnections as shown in Fig. 2.5 [4].
We assume that power-grid components utilize intelligent electronic devices (IEDs),
which host control and measurement agents. The control agents have actuators that
enable the implementation of remote control signals such as breaker tripping and adjustment of the transformer tap setting. In this dissertation, we consider two types
of control and measurement agents. First, we consider control agents at substations
that implement remote load-shedding control signals by sending appropriate signals
to their associated distribution network. Second, we consider measurement agents
that measure the temperature of high voltage transmission lines and send the measurements to the control center. We use these agents, which communicate with the
control center using the communication network, to introduce certain interdepen-
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Figure 2.4: A reliability coordinator region composed of two BAs.

Figure 2.5: The electrical infrastructure of the United States is composed of three interconnections as described by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC).
The interconnection map is from [4].

dencies between the power grid and the communication system.
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2.2

Overloading and failure mechanism

Line overloading is a key mechanism in propagation of failures in power grids during
cascading failures. When a line becomes overloaded, it may be tripped by protection
relays or fail due to sagging into nearby trees and shorting to ground. For simplicity
we call the nonfunctional lines (e.g., lines that are tripped by protection relays,
overheated or physically failed) the failed lines. In power grids, the load of failed
lines is shifted onto other lines in the system. In this section, we introduce our
assumptions about line overloading and the failure mechanism.
A transmission line has a power-flow capacity that can be governed by the thermal
limit, the voltage drop limit, or the steady-state stability limit of the line [52]. We
denote the power-flow capacity of a transmission line, say the kth line, by Ckopt . The
Ckopt values of the transmission lines are used by the control center of the power grid
as constraints, for example, in optimizing the power flow in the system.
Similarly to the approach presented in [53], we consider a threshold αk for the
power flow through the kth line above which the protection relay (e.g., circuit breaker
or impedance protective relay) trips the line. Various factors and mechanisms in the
power grid may affect the threshold α for transmission lines. For example, line
overloading may lead to smaller measured impedance than relay settings [54], the
thermal power-flow capacity of a transmission line may vary due to changes in the
surrounding temperature and ambient weather conditions [55], or problems in the
communication/control system may lead to inaccurate Ckopt assumption in the control
center. In all of these examples, the protection relay may trip the line when the power
flow exceeds the threshold αk . Now one may interpret the discrepancy between the
threshold value, αk , which represents the true capacity of the line, and the nominal
capacity, Ckopt , as an error by the control center in its estimation of the true capacity
of the lines. By adopting this point of view, in this dissertation we term Ckopt − αk
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the capacity estimation error. While the approach presented in [53] considers a
fixed threshold, here we assume varying threshold to capture the effects of various
parameters on the threshold and consequently on the cascading behavior. In our
simulations, we quantify Ckopt − αk by a fraction of Ckopt , i.e., Ckopt − αk = eCkopt for
e ∈ [0, 0.5]. Therefore, we assume a line is overloaded when the power flow through
the line exceeds (1−e)Ckopt . As such, the parameter e controls the capacity estimation
error. Moreover, we categorize all the transmission lines in the power grid based
upon their capacity values into five categories with values from the set C = {20MW,
80MW, 200MW, 500MW, 800MW} [52]. Similarly to the work presented in [56], in
our simulations we allow only one line trip at a time by randomly (according to the
size of overload) tripping one of the overloaded lines.
Studies of major blackouts have shown that incorrect operation of protection
relays contributes to cascading failures [4]. To capture this effect in our simulations,
we have considered a small probability (0.04) for mis-operation of protection relays.
Due to space constraints, we will not investigate the effects of the mis-operation
of the protection relays on cascading behavior further. A study of such effects is
presented in [57].

2.3

Interdependency parameters

In this section, we introduce interdependency parameters assumed in this dissertation based on the agents introduced in Section 2.1. The assumed interdependencies
may lead to propagation of failures between the two systems; however, interdependencies can generally increase or decrease the reliability of interdependent systems.
In line with the definitions presented in [23], we introduce three primary categories
of interdependencies considered in this dissertation between the power grid and the
communication system.

27

Chapter 2. Interdependent electric and cyber infrastructures
• Physical interdependencies: Example of such interdependency is when
communication nodes rely on the power-grid energy delivery to operate. As
such, failures in the power grid may interrupt the operation of the communication network.
• Cyber interdependencies: The efficient and reliable operation of the power
grid relies on the information transfer and information processing by control
and communication systems. For example, transmitting remote control signals
to remote substations to implement load shedding or opening a circuit breaker
in the case of contingencies relies on the communication network. Moreover,
having an accurate estimate of the state of the power grid depends heavily on
accurate and reliable information processing in the control and communication
systems.
• Geographical interdependencies: Geographically correlated events can affect components of both of the systems if components of the interdependent
systems are geographically co-located. In other words, a local environmental
event can cause failures in both of the systems. For example, if a transmission
tower collapses then both the transmission line and the OPGW communication
line using that tower will fail simultaneously.
Next, we introduce the interdependency parameters assumed in this dissertation.
Recall that in the previous section we introduced parameter e, which captures the
effects of various factors and mechanisms that may lead to failure of transmission
lines when their power flow is within a certain range of the maximum capacity
assumed by the control center. We use parameter e to control the error in estimating
the capacity of lines. As mentioned earlier this parameter can capture the effects
of inefficiencies in the control and communication systems on the threshold. This
interdependency parameter, namely capacity estimation error, can capture certain
cyber interdependencies.
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Although this interdependency parameter can capture a wide range of scenarios,
here we explain its application with a specific example. A key solution in reacting to
contingencies in power grids is to safely utilize the existing transmission capacity to
its maximum in order to avoid over-curtailment of loads and limiting power delivery.
Clearly, monitoring the transmission capacity is critical for carrying out this solution.
The power-flow capacity of a transmission line can be defined, for example, by its
thermal limit. The measurement agents send the measured temperatures to the
control center. Estimating the temperature from the measurements and accurately
estimating the capacity of the transmission lines can help in reacting to emergency
scenarios more efficiently. However, error in these estimations due to error, delay
and interruption in communication networks can result in either underutilization of
resources or overloading of lines, which can severely affect the reliability of the power
grid.
The second interdependency parameter considered in this dissertation is loadshedding constraint level. Load shedding is a critical control action when the system
must be reconfigured to accommodate the disturbances on the grid. The efficiency of
the load shedding in responding to cascading failures depends upon the constraints
in implementing the load shedding in the system. The constraint level is governed,
for example, by control and marketing policies, regulations, physical constraints, and
communication limitations. The ratio of the uncontrollable loads (loads that do not
participate in load shedding) to the total load of a substation is termed the loadshedding constraint level, denoted by θ ∈ [0, 1], where θ = 1 means load shedding
cannot be implemented and θ = 0 means unconstrained load shedding. The loadshedding constraint level can also capture certain cyber interdependencies.
We explain the load-shedding constraint level with the following example. The
power grid relies on the communication system for transmitting load-shedding control
signals to substations in the case of contingencies. We assume that communication
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irregularities may lead to the inability of control agents to efficiently implement the
load shedding. Sources of such inabilities include failure of communication system to
send the load-shedding control signal from the control center to the control agents,
for example, due to denial of service (DoS) attack to certain servers, as well as failures
at the control agents. Note that physical limitation of components and marketing
policies in the power grid may also restrict the application of the optimal loadshedding controls. For example, different customers may have different interruption
costs for the load curtailment; alternatively, there may exist critical loads that cannot
be curtailed from the grid (based on policy or physical constraints) or the priorities
that may apply to load shedding. The parameter θ can capture such scenarios
and controls the level of controllability of the load shedding at substations in our
simulations. To implement this constraint in the simulator, we decompose the load
of a substation (represented by Li ) into a dispatchable part (controllable load) with
value (1 − θi )Li and a fixed load with value θi Li . These values are used in the
power-flow optimization problem introduced in the next section.
The last interdependency parameter assumed in this dissertation is called failure
propagation probability, which captures the dependency of the communication system
on the power grid. Similarly to [31], we assume that a communication component fails
probabilistically (with probability q) if a power component in its geographical vicinity
fails. This dependency leads to propagation of failures from the power system to the
communication network. The failure propagation probability can capture certain
physical or geographical interdependencies.
To summarize, the introduced interdependency parameters are capacity estimation error, load-shedding constraint level, and failure propagation probability. The
effects of these parameters on the power-flow distribution are captured by a coupled
power-flow optimization framework as described in the next section.
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2.4

Coupled power-flow optimization framework

Consider the transmission system of a power grid with V nodes (substations) interconnected by m transmission lines. The sets L and G are the set of load buses and
the set of generator buses, respectively. The notation Li represents the demand at
the load bus i. The DC power-flow equations [49] can be summarized as
F̃ = AP̃ ,

(2.1)

where P̃ is a power vector whose components are the input power of nodes in the
grid (except the reference generator), F̃ is a vector whose m components are the
power flow through the transmission lines, and A is a matrix whose elements can be
calculated in terms of the connectivity of transmission lines in the power grid and
the impedance of lines. This system of equations does not have a unique solution.
Therefore, to find the solution to this system we use, as done in [53], a standard
optimization approach with the objective of minimizing the simple cost function
below:
Cost =

X
i∈G

w g i gi +

X

w ℓ j ℓj .

(2.2)

j∈L

A solution to this optimization problem is the pair gi and ℓj that minimizes the
cost function in (2.2). Note that ℓj = θj Lj + bj , where bj will be determined by
the optimization solution. In this cost function, w g i and w ℓ j are positive values
representing the generation cost for every node i ∈ G and the load-shedding price
for every node j ∈ L, respectively. We assume a high price for load shedding so that
a load is to be curtailed only when there is generation inadequacy or transmission
capacity limitations. The constraints for this optimization problem are listed below.
(a) DC power flow equations: F̃ = AP̃ .
(b) Limits on the generators’ power: 0 ≤ gi ≤ Gi max , i ∈ G.
(c) Limits on the controllable loads: (1 − θj )Lj ≤ bj ≤ 0, j ∈ L.
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(d) Limits on the power flow through the lines:
|F̃k | ≤ Ckopt for k ∈ {1, ..., m}.
(e) Power balance constraints (power generated and consumed must be balanced):
P
P
i∈G gi +
j∈L ℓj = 0.

Note that in the above formulation, the quantities ℓj s are negative and the gi s

are positive by definition.
Besides the interdependency parameters that affect the solution of this optimization framework, we introduce another power grid operating setting termed power-grid
loading level, which represents the level of stress over the grid in terms of the loading
level of its components. We denote the power-grid loading level by r, defined as the
ratio of the total demand to generation-capacity of the power grid. The operating
parameter r affects the initial load on the system, i.e., the Lj s. Furthermore, we
assume that the load at substations are constant over the time interval that cascading failures occur since the duration of cascading failures is short. The solution to
this optimization problem determines the amount of load shed, generation and the
power flow through the lines. If failures occur in the power grid, we assume that the
control center redistributes the power in the grid by solving the above optimization
problem. If the new power-flow distribution overloads lines (based on the overload
definition in Section 2.2), more failures will occur in the power grid. This process
iterates until no more failures occur in the system.
We use MATPOWER [58], a package of MATLAB m-files, for solving the optimal power flow and simulating cascading failures. The quasi-static approaches
that employ a power-flow distribution framework together with a method to identify
overloaded lines and individual failures to model cascading failures have been used
in several works in the literature such as [54, 56, 59].
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2.5

Impact of interdependencies on reliability of
the electric-cyber infrastructure

In this section, we first introduce four scenarios representing different levels of interdependencies between the power grid and the communication system. These scenarios
include no-coupling, coupling through capacity estimation error, coupling through
the load-shedding controllability, and coupling through both of the last two parameters. In the no-coupling scenario, the effects of failures do not propagate from the
communication network to the power grid and vice versa. The no-coupling scenario
is similar to the case that we consider cascading failures in the power grid alone
while assuming perfect communication system. We also use the failure propagation
parameter q, introduced earlier to change the strength of interdependency between
the communication system and the power grid. In the introduced coupling scenarios,
failures propagate to the communication system with probability q and failures in
the communication network affect cascading failures in the power grid through the
interdependency parameters introduced in Section 2.3, namely θ and e. In our simulations presented here, we have considered the IEEE 118 bus system along with a
communication network with the same topology as the IEEE 118 bus system shown
in Fig. 2.2 with the control center marked with the circle. We assume that failure
of a line in the power grid results in probabilistic failure of the corresponding link
in the communication network as well as its adjacent communication links, which
share the communication node with that link. We set the value of parameter θ at
different substations based on their connectivity to the control center, namely, if a
substation is connected to the control center we assume θ = 0 and otherwise θ = 1.
We also simply assume that the value of parameter e depends on the connectivity
of the communication network and increases with the hop distance from the control
center due to possible delays in the communication network as the distance increases.

33

Average size of cascading failures

Chapter 2. Interdependent electric and cyber infrastructures
60

No coupling
LS coupling
Estimation error coupling
LS and estimation error coupling

55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Failure propagation probability, q
Figure 2.6: Average size of cascading failures (number of tripped lines) as a function of q
and different levels of coupling between the power system and the communication network
(here, LS stands for load shedding).

We have triggered cascading failures in the power grid by two or three random
initial failures. The size of cascading failures is obtained by simulations of cascading
failures in the power grid using the power-flow optimization framework introduced
in Section 2.4. The results shown in Fig. 2.6 are obtained by averaging the size of
cascading failures over 500 realizations. We measure the size of cascading failures
using the number of tripped overloaded lines in the power grid. As expected, in
Fig. 2.6 we observe that the size of cascading failures increases with the level of
coupling between the two systems. We observe that coupling through load shedding is
highly sensitive to connectivity of the communication system and the communication
system disconnections make the cascading behavior more severe.
The goal of the next experiment is to study the effects of partially or fully losing
control over substations for performing load shedding on the cascading behavior of
the power grid. We have generated approximately 10,000 realizations of the vector
θ. For each realization, we have calculated the ratio of total controllable load over
P
P
△
the total load in the grid, rc/t = ( i∈L (1 − θi )Li )/ i∈L Li . Next, we categorized the
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realizations based on the calculated rc/t values into 10 equal-length sub-intervals in
[0, 1]. In order to have the same number of realizations in each interval we selected
200 realizations in each interval. For each of the realizations we ran Monte-Carlo
simulation 200 times, where in each simulation we select three transmission line
failures randomly.
The average number of failed lines due to overloading is shown in Fig. 2.7-a as
a function of rc/t for both scenarios of binary θi values as well as θi values in the
interval (0, 1]. From the results shown in Fig. 2.7-a we observe that when full control
is achievable over the loads in the grid (e.g., when there are no vulnerabilities in the
control/communication system), control actions can mitigate the effects of initial
disturbances and prevent the occurrence of cascading failures. Therefore, there are
only few (e.g., < 5) failures on average when rc/t = 1. However, losing control over
the load buses results in an increase in the average number of failures and a high
probability of cascading failures. In addition, we observe that when the power grid is
operating near its maximum capacity, vulnerabilities in the control/communication
system can have drastic effects. In Fig. 2.7-a we have shown the cascading-failure
phenomenon, measured by the number of transmission-line failures in the system.
Our simulations show a similar trend in the cascading behavior if we consider the
amount of unserved loads in the system, as shown in Fig. 2.7-b. The reason for
the similarity in the trends in cascading behavior in both cases (when considering
the number of transmission-line failure and unserved loads) can be explained as
follows. In the presence of control/communication vulnerabilities, it is more likely
that lines become overloaded and hence fail. Thus the load buses disconnect from the
grid in addition to the loads that have been curtailed from the system. Therefore,
the total amount of unserved load in these cases are larger than that in the case
when controlled load curtailment is performed. Another intuitive observation made
from Fig. 2.7-a is that for a fixed amount of uncontrollable load over the grid, the
scenario for which we totally lose control over certain load buses results in a more
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Figure 2.7: (a) Average number of failed lines, and (b) average total unserved load, due to
cascading failures as a function of the ratio of total controllable loads over the total load
in the grid.

severe cascading effect compared to that for the scenarios where we lose control
over a portion of the load in the load buses. This may correspond to the scenario,
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where the automatic relays can still perform sub-optimally without the control center
interference.

2.6

Impact of communication system’s connectivity on cascading failures

In this section, using the introduced simulation framework, we show that the connectivity of the communication system affects the reliability of the power grid. Using
this simulation framework, we also identify characteristics of the areas of the power
grid, which require more protection and communication connectivity.
In this section, we consider a set of candidate topologies for the communication
system of the power grid. This set includes a network with the same topology as the
power grid connectivity, the base topology. We also consider random variations of
the base topology by generating two random sets of topologies based upon the base
topology; one set with randomly removed links while maintaining the connectivity
(smaller average degree of nodes, where degree is defined to be the number of nodes
having direct link to the node) and one set with randomly added links (larger average
degree of nodes). Note that the set of nodes in all the topologies are assumed to
be the same. Similarly to the previous section, we assume that failure of a line
in the power grid results in probabilistic failure of the corresponding link in the
communication network as well as its adjacent communication links, which share the
communication node with that link. We set the value of parameter θ at different
substations based on their connectivity to the control center, namely, if a substation
is connected to the control center we assume θ = 0 and otherwise θ = 1. In general,
we assume that the communication connectivity affects the load shedding constraint
level of substations.
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Figure 2.8: Average size of cascading failures (number of tripped lines) as a function of
average degree of nodes in the communication network when probability of propagation of
failures to the communication system is 0.5.

We trigger cascading failures in the power grid by two or three random initial
failures. The size of cascading failures is obtained by simulations of cascading failures in the power grid using the power-flow optimization framework introduced in
Section 2.4. In the simulations, for each value of the average degree of nodes we
have used 20 randomly generated topologies with approximately the same average
degree. In Fig. 2.8, we observe that the connectivity of the communication network
affects cascading failures in power grids. The results presented in Fig. 2.8 suggest a
critical value of average degree of nodes (approximately 3 in this example) for which
the size of cascading failures drops sharply. We interpret this value as the minimum
connectivity of the communication network that can considerably reduce the risk of
large cascading failures in the power grid. Thus we conjecture that the communication network can be strengthened by adding more links to enhance the robustness of
the power grid to cascading failures. Further, notice that as described earlier when
the level of coupling between the two systems increases the probability of cascading
failures also increases.
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Figure 2.9: Probability of cascading failure as a function of the minimum total capacity of
the connected lines to substations with communication problems for three different number
of substations.

In the next study, we identify vulnerable areas of the communication system
where connectivity problems (disconnections from the control center, which result
in θ = 1) increase the risk of cascading failures. In this study, we consider certain
number of substations (specifically 3, 5, or 8) randomly selected from the power grid
and assume that they are disconnected from the control center, i.e., we set θ = 1 for
the selected substations. We study the effects of the area, where such communication
failures occur, on cascading failures and describe such areas based on the characteristics of the power system. As such, we identify the area of the power grid that
requires more protection and communication connectivity. In Fig. 2.9, we present
the probability of having ten or more failures beyond the initial three failures. Based
on the simulation results presented in Fig. 2.9 we observe that when the minimum
total capacity of the lines connected to a substation with communication problems
is above a certain threshold, then the probability of having cascading failures drops
sharply. The behavior observed in Fig. 2.9 can be explained as follows. Since we
assume that the load-shedding control action cannot be implemented on the substations with communication problems then if they have lines with low capacities,

39

Chapter 2. Interdependent electric and cyber infrastructures
there is a high probability of overloading such line in the case of contingencies that
necessitate load curtailments. Thus, based on these results we conjecture that the
capacity of the lines connected to the substations with communication problems impact the cascading behavior. In particular, substations that have weak lines are
vulnerable areas in the case of communication problems in their associated control
and communication components.

2.7

Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, we stated the assumptions made about the interdependency of the
power grid and the communication system that lead to propagation of failures between the two systems. We developed a simulation framework for simulating cascading failures in electric-cyber infrastructures. The proposed framework is an integrated
power-flow optimization framework, which captures the effects of the introduced interdependencies on the power-flow distribution of the system. Based on the simulation results presented in this chapter, we conjecture that interdependencies between
the power grid and communication system as well as the level of coupling between
the two systems affect the cascading behavior in a substantial way. Furthermore,
we showed that the connectivity of the communication network, measured by the
average degree of nodes, does affect the cascading behavior in the power grid also in
a substantial way. Thus, it is essential to consider such interdependencies in analysis of the reliability of electric-cyber infrastructures. As such, we have investigated
the effects of interdependencies between power and communication systems on the
stochastic dynamics of cascading failures in Chapters 4 and 6 and we have identified
interdependency characteristics that largely affect the probability of large blackouts.
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Chapter 3
Impact of spatial distribution of
failures on the infrastructure
reliability
Physical infrastructures are vulnerable to spatially correlated failures arising from
various physical stresses such as natural disasters (earthquakes and hurricanes) as
well as malicious coordinated attacks. Correlated component failures in physical
systems, such as power and communication systems, and their effects on reliability
of the system have been largely the concern of researchers for a long time [60–62].
However, there are very few effective works in modeling such real-world scenarios. In
this chapter, we present a simulation framework, which provides a systematic way of
simulating correlated failures. We use this framework to study the effects of spatial
distribution of failures on the reliability of the power grid and the communication
system.
Some disaster events such as earthquakes and terrorist attacks may occur in
more than one location in a short period of time. Hence, multiple sets of correlated
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failures may occur if more events occurred before the previous set of failures were
repaired. Here, the statistical properties of induced-failure patterns depend upon
the spatial interaction among stress centers (e.g., interaction among earthquake or
attack locations). We present a stochastic model, based on spatial point processes,
for representing stress centers in geographical plane in order to facilitate the modeling
of spatially inhomogeneous and correlated failures in an infrastructure. This model
is then used to further generate scenarios with inhibition and clustering between
stress centers, which enables detailed assessment of vulnerabilities of the system to
the level of inhomogeneity and spatial correlation in the stress-event centers.

3.1
3.1.1

Modeling spatially correlated failures
Related prior work

There are several works on characterizing the effects of correlated failures on the
reliability of various systems. Most of the works in this area are in the context of
communication networks. Meanwhile, the effects of correlated failures have not been
extensively studied in the context of power grids. Here, we provide a short review of
the efforts in understanding the effects of correlated failures in both contexts.
In an early work for modeling correlated failures [63], the authors considered
the dependence between link failures in a communication system and presented an
event-based reliability model. In their model, independent events are used to generate dependent link failures. This is achieved by defining independent events over
sets of components (links), which, for example, share common equipments. Early
origins of correlated failures in communication networks were primarily the common
equipments between a set of components and the fact that failure of the equipment
results in failure of all the components in the set. Here, the events have certain
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probabilities of occurrence; however, components in the set sharing the equipment
fail with certainty if the event happens. In a similar way, the concept of Shared Risk
Link Group (SRLG) has been proposed in [64] in order to address multiple correlated
link failures. An SRLG is a set of links sharing a common physical resource (cable,
conduit, etc.) and thus a common risk of failure. Later, the authors in [65] used
the concept of probabilistic SRLG to address the stochastic correlated component
failures. In this model components in an SRLG fail in a probabilistic sense.
In contrast to previously mentioned works, there are other works that have focused on failures within specific geographical regions [66], [67]; such a assumption
implies that the failed components do not necessarily share the same physical resources [68]. In [62], a framework is presented to model correlated failures caused
by disasters on the networks using vertical cuts; nonetheless, the model is limited
to bipartite networks and vertical regional disasters, making it inadequate for modeling stress from events such as attacks and earthquakes. The authors in [66] have
modeled the disaster or attack using a circular cut, which is modeled as a disk of
certain radius centered at the event location; they have assessed the vulnerability of
fiber infrastructures to both circular and vertical cuts. In a similar approach, the
authors in [68] used a probabilistic failure model in which components in the vicinity
of the disaster (inside the disc) fail with some probability while other components
(outside the disc) do not fail. However, using the same probability of failure for all
the components inside the disc is not realistic since the effect of events reduces as
the distance to the center of the event increases.
Correlated failures have also been studied in logical topologies (higher layers of
network protocol stack) of networks [69] and [70]. In many of these kind of studies,
random graphs and percolation theory [71] are common tools to evaluate the effect
of random component failures in the network. An example of the source of such
correlated failures are logical attacks such as coordinated cyber attacks, e.g., DoS
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(Denial of Service) affecting higher layer components of networks such as routers.
There are other works that discuss correlated failures in various contexts ( [72, 73])
other than communication networks. There are also some models for temporally
correlated failures [74]. Most related work to our approach is the work in [68], which
considers multiple disasters with circular cuts. Akin to this effort, we have also
identified the most vulnerable points of the network by defining various scenarios of
events on the network.
Studies of correlated failures in the context of power grids are limited to few
works [60, 61, 75]. In [60, 61], the authors study the effects of correlated failures on
cascading failures. This model, which is inspired by methods developed for networksurvivability analysis, is used to identify the most vulnerable location in the grid. In
this work, authors consider contingency events that are initiated by geographically
correlated failures modeled using a disk of certain radius. However, the vulnerable
locations of the grid have been identified by computational geometric methods only
based on the topological properties of the grid, which were then fed into the powerflow distribution problem as the initial trigger points for correlated failures. The
effects of correlated power-line failures on the total system load shed have been
investigated in [75]. This work uses Monte-Carlo simulations of cascading failures for
estimating the statistics of the system load shed as a function of stochastic failures.
However, correlated failures considered in this work are not spatially correlated;
the correlation is based on the total correlation defined between the random binary
variables representing the functionality of lines.
The model presented in this chapter is different from the above works, as it provides a powerful tool to systematically generate scenarios of multiple disaster events
with various level of spatial correlation among their centers in order to accurately
capture the geographical correlation that exists in real-world scenarios. This framework can be used for Monte Carlo simulations of correlated failures to study the
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reliability of the system. We use this framework to first study the effects of correlated failures on communication networks and next, to investigate how correlated
failures in the communication system affect the reliability of the power grid through
the interdependencies introduced in Chapter 2.

3.1.2

Probabilistic model for spatially correlated failures

In this section, we present a probabilistic approach for modeling correlated failures
due to multiple external stress-events in a physical system. We present this model in
the context of communication network with the understanding that it is applicable
to any geographically distributed physical system. In this model, we describe a technique for determining the probability of physical damages (failures) for an arbitrary
collection of links due to external stress-events with spatially correlated centers. As
described earlier, while disaster events are stochastic they can exhibit spatial correlations. Furthermore, there can be spatial inhomogeneity in the concentration of
event centers since certain locations are more prone to host the events than others.

(a)

(b)

Figure 3.1: Superposition of 50 realizations of a point process each having 5 event centers
in the plane. (a) Points resulting from uniform (homogeneous) intensity function; and
(b) points resulting from an inhomogeneous intensity function with two regions of high
concentration.

Figure 3.1-a shows an example of a uniform (homogeneous) Poisson point process
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in the plane. In this case, events can occur anywhere in the plane and without
any spatial structure; namely, these patterns are the result of a uniform intensity
function (i.e., a flat surface over the geographical plane of interest) [76]. In contrast,
Fig. 3.1-b shows an inhomogeneous point process with two concentration locations
for events. The inhomogeneity in the concentration of events is affected by a nonconstant intensity function representing the probability of hosting individual stressevents at each point of the plane. For example, to allow more events to occur in
a specific geographical area of interest, we set a peak in the probability intensity
surface over the specific area.

(b)

(a)

Figure 3.2: Realizations of a Strauss point process with inhomogeneous intensity function
and interaction between events for the cases of (a) inhibition and (b) clustering.

Next, we employ an interaction point process model [76] to capture both spatial
inhomogeneity and spatial interaction between event centers. The assumption for
certain events is that the occurrence of an event in a location affects the likelihood
of the occurrence of other events in its vicinity. This effect is called inhibition if the
likelihood is reduced and it is called clustering if the likelihood is increased. The
Strauss point process is the simplest yet very effective model for inhibition and clustering effects [77]. In the case of inhibition, the probability of the occurrence of points
within a fixed radius of an existing point is reduced. When this probability is zero,
the inhibition is referred to as hard-core inhibition. In a similar way, in the clustering
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case the probability of occurrence of events inside of a fixed radius of existing events
is enhanced. To simulate the Strauss point process, we use the algorithm presented
in [78]. Figure 3.2 shows realizations of Strauss point process with inhomogeneous
intensity function (Fig. 3.1-b) and inhibition and clustering effects between centers.
Note that the model tends to bias the event centers to be more likely to occur in the
vicinity of the two regions of high concentration shown in Fig. 3.1-b. At the same
time, however, there is inhibition and clustering effects between these points defined
through the interaction function described bellow. Figure 3.2-a shows a realization
with inhibition between event centers, while in Fig. 3.2-b there are clusters of event
centers. Next, we will briefly describe pairwise interaction point-processes [76] of
the type used here in order to introduce the key controls of the model in generating
various interesting scenarios of events that are relevant to reliability.
Let D be a bounded subset of the plane. An interaction point process is a Dn valued random vector, v = (V1 , V2 , ..., Vn ), which has a probability density of the
form
f (v) = z −1

Y

Θ(vk )

1≤k≤n

Y

ϕ(kvi − vj k),

(3.1)

1≤i≤j≤n

where v = (v1 , ..., vn ) ∈ Dn , and k · k is the Euclidean norm in the plane and z is a
normalizing constant [76]. The function Θ represents the intensity function of point
distributions. The function ϕ : [0, ∞) → [0, ∞) is called the pairwise interaction
function; the pairwise behavior of events can be defined through this function. As
an example, in the Strauss model [77], ϕ is defined to be equal to a specified value,
c, for pairs of points that are within the range R, and it is set to unity otherwise.
The density function of the Strauss process is then
f (v) = z −1 cSv (R) ,

(3.2)

where for R > 0 and
X
Sv (R) =
I(0,R] (kvi − vj k)

(3.3)

1≤i≤j≤n
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is the number of pairs of coordinates (points) in v with pairwise distance less than
or equal to R, and for any set A, IA (a) = 1 whenever a ∈ A and IA (a) = 0 otherwise.
Based on the density function of the Strauss model, a value of c greater than 1 results
in clustering and a value of c less than 1 results in inhibition. Note that when c = 1
we obtain the totally random (Poisson) scenario of events in the geographical plane.
Furthermore, the parameter R in the Strauss model controls the range of interactions
between pairs of points.

Figure 3.3: A representative CLpd corresponding to a sample realization of 4 event locations.

Next, we define the conditional likelihood function of physical damage, CLpd (u),
u ∈ R2 , for all the points over the geographical plane. Specifically, we define the
intensity of the damage at points of the plane using Gaussian functions placed atop
each event center. The Gaussian function is a convenient and appropriate function
to model the range and intensity of the disaster events over the geographical plane
because of its symmetric bell shape that quickly falls off towards plus/minus infinity.
The variance of the Gaussian function controls the width of the bell or the range
and intensity of the disaster event. The Gaussian functions on top of multiple events
are summed up and normalized (to unity) to yield CLpd (·). Summing the Gaussian
functions also captures the net result of adding the effects of multiple individual
disaster events as the Gaussian functions overlap. We define the probability that a
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line, say k, fails after the occurrence of a disaster event to be maxu∈k (CLpd (u)).
Figure 3.3 shows a representative CLpd corresponding to a sample realization
of four event locations with the Gaussian functions atop each event. Note that
conditional on a particular realization of CLpd , the physical failures of links (in any
collection of links) are independent; however, correlation between physical damage
is inherited from the correlation in the event centers associated with CLpd and the
geographical proximity of the links to the event centers. The c and R parameters
of the Strauss model as well as the variance of the Gaussian function give us the
ability to capture scenarios of events with various spatial correlations among their
centers with non-uniform spatial intensity in a plane of interest. As a result, we
have an effective tool to simulate desirable scenarios of spatial stress-events on the
geographical plane to assess the reliability and efficiency of the network in the case
of various stress scenarios.

3.2

Impact of correlated failures on communication systems

In this section, the reliability and efficiency of communication networks in the presence of geographically correlated failures due to multiple disaster events are evaluated
using Monte-Carlo simulations. Specifically, a Monte-Carlo simulator for generating
correlated failures based on the model presented in the previous section is developed
in MATLAB. The evaluations of the reliability and efficiency of the network are presented here for different scenarios of interest for the spatial distribution of the stress
centers. In our simulations, we have considered the topology of a fiber backbone
operated by a major network provider in the United States as shown in Fig. 3.4.
As described earlier the model enables us to control the clustering and inhibition
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characteristics of the disaster events through the selection of the c and R parameters
of the Strauss model. It also enables the control of the severity of the events (how
strong is the disaster event in affecting the network components and the range of
their impact) through the selection of the variance of the Gaussian functions. For
a larger intensity of disaster events, a larger variance for the Gaussian function is
used.

Figure 3.4: A random sample of stress-event centers with the Strauss settings of c = 0.3
and R = 500, and the variance of Gaussian function set to 600.

We shall define four scenarios of interest for the locations of stress-events and
evaluate the reliability of the network in these four scenarios. In the first scenario we
use the inhibition setting in the Strauss model so as to generate random realizations
of event centers that are likely to be far from each other. In this scenario the
probability of the occurrence of events within a fixed radius of an existing point is
reduced. We define the radius to be 500 miles (R1 = 500 miles), the c parameter to
be 0.3 and the variance of the Gaussian functions is set to 600. A random sample of
this scenario is shown in Fig. 3.4.
The rest of the scenarios are based on clustering mode in the Strauss model with
the cluster radius used as a free parameter. In these scenarios, we assume that the
probability of events happening farther than R miles is reduced. For each scenario
we set the maximum distance between events to R2 = 200, R3 = 100, and R4 = 20
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miles, respectively, and the c parameter for all these scenarios is set to 80. Random
samples of each of these scenarios are presented in Figs. 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. Note that
in the samples of the Strauss model corresponding to the fourth scenario, events are
not farther than 20 miles apart; therefore, stress centers are closer than those in
the remaining clustering scenarios. In all the simulations of this section we assume
four number of disaster events; however, any number of events can be assumed. For
comparison, we also consider the independent link failure scenario without the use
of external events to represent the case of totally uncorrelated link failures in the
network. (In the latter scenario we do not follow the event-center approach to insure
that there is no correlation in the failures.) Next, we present our predictions of the
effects of the aforementioned failure scenarios on network reliability and efficiency.

Figure 3.5: A random sample of stress-event centers with the Strauss settings of C = 80
and R = 200, and the variance of Gaussian function set to 600.

We have evaluated the reliability of the network based on two metrics: the average
two-terminal reliability (ATTR) [68], which is a measure of global connectivity of the
network, and the connectivity probability, which is the fraction of the number of
times the network remains connected over all runs of the simulations. In Fig. 3.8,
the ATTR values for the four mentioned scenarios and the independent link failure
case are presented for different values of the stress effects represented by the variance
of the Gaussian functions. For each scenario we have generated 500 random samples
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Figure 3.6: A random sample of event centers with the Strauss settings of C = 80 and
R = 100, and the variance of Gaussian function set to 600.

Figure 3.7: A random sample of stress-event centers with the Strauss settings of C = 80
and R = 20, and the variance of Gaussian function set to 600.

and the presented results are the average over all 500 samples. (Note that for the
independent link failure scenario, we have calculated the average number of failed
links in other four scenarios for each variance value and then generated the same
number of failures randomly among the links.)
Based on Fig. 3.8, in the first failure scenario the ATTR is higher than those for
other scenarios except for the independent link failure case. For small values of the
variance of the Gaussian functions, the correlation among failures due to geographical
proximity decreases. Moreover, since in the first scenario the event centers do not
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Figure 3.8: Average two-terminal reliability.
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Figure 3.9: Average two-terminal reliability.

occur closer than R1 of each other, the ATTR value is higher for smaller variances
compared to independent link failure case. However, as effect-range or intensity
of the disaster increases, the correlation between link failures due to geographical
proximity increases, which, in turn, causes the reliability of the network to decrease
compared with independent link failure scenario. The other interesting observation
in Fig. 3.8 is that the reliability of the network is less affected in the scenarios with
smaller cluster radius than that in the larger clusters. Note that size of clusters
assumed to be less than 20 percent of the size of the geographical plane over which
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the network is expanded.
Figure 3.9 shows the ATTR value for the samples with the same number of
failures and for the variance of the Gaussian functions set to 1200. In this case,
we have taken the average of ATTR over all the realizations with the same number
of failures for the four aforementioned scenarios. As such, this plot shows that if
we have the same number of failures in the network with different characteristics,
they will have different effects on the network reliability. We can conclude based
on these two plots that the clustering scenarios with larger effect-range, namely the
second scenario (R2 = 200), affect the ATTR value more significantly than the other
scenarios. As before, the independent random link failure case affects the reliability
less severely than other scenarios because of the lack of geographical correlation
between the failures.
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Figure 3.10: Connectivity probability.

Figure 3.10 presents the connectivity probability of the network for the different
scenarios based on the variance of the Gaussian functions. Note that the clustering
scenarios have lower connectivity probability than other scenarios. This is because
the geographical correlation that is present amongst stress centers results in substantial geographically correlated link failures, thereby lowering reliability.
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Figure 3.11: Global efficiency of the network.

In studying the network efficiency, we have adopted the global efficiency metric
defined in [79], which is the average of the inverse of the shortest path length between
all the nodes of the network. The results of the global efficiency of the network are
presented in Fig. 3.11. Note the similarity of the behavior of the efficiency metric in
this figure compared to the ATTR metric shown in Fig. 3.9.
Finally, we have also conducted a study on the most vulnerable regions of the
network and the worst-case scenario of the link failures. To do this, we tested 2000
random samples of each scenario with four number of disaster events and searched for
the stress-distribution scenario that resulted in the least network reliability amongst
the four stress-event center scenarios. In this simulation, we fixed the intensity of the
stress-event occurrence to 600. The “vulnerable” regions are identified with circles in
Fig. 3.12. These regions are nearly matched with the results presented by Agarwal et
al. [68], which did not use a stochastic approach for the distribution of stress-event
centers but rather used a greedy heuristic approach that finds the vulnerable points
of the network for two simultaneous events. Furthermore, the worst-case scenario for
the four number of the disaster events is the second scenario, which is a clustering
scenario with a radius of 200 miles.
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Figure 3.12: Vulnerable points of the network assuming a variance of 600 for the Gaussian
functions and a random sample of the third stress-event-center scenario.

3.3

Impact of correlated failures on the reliability
of electric-cyber infrastructures

In this section, we investigate the effects of spatial distribution of failures in the
communication network on cascading failures in power grids using the simulation
framework presented in Section 3.1.2. Specifically, we study the effects of inhibition
and clustering among communication failures on cascading failures. We consider the
IEEE 118 bus system as the transmission grid and assume the same topology as
the power grid for the communication system. We also assume that communication
node failures occur only due to external stressors such as natural disasters. In other
words, we assume that failures do not propagate from the power grid to the communication system and thus the only set of failures in the communication network is the
initial correlated failures. The effects of interdependencies between the power grid
and communication system and propagation of failures between the two systems are
studied in Chapter 2. We use the interdependency parameter, namely load-shedding
constraint level, introduced in Chapter 2, to capture the effects of correlated communication failures on the power grid. We assume that communication nodes that
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have been failed or disconnected from the control center due to initial external events
become uncontrollable for load shedding control actions and hence we set θ = 1 for
such substations.

Figure 3.13: Cascading behavior of the power grid for various distributions of communication failures. Two scenarios, each shown in a sub-figure, are considered for two scenarios
of two initial transmission line failures.

First, we study how the distribution of communication failures affects the cascading behavior. Understanding the effects of the spatial distribution and topological
location of control/communication failures is useful in designing reliable coupled control/communication system for power grids. For this study, we use the simulation
framework based on point processes in a setting with c = 1, which results in totally
random (Poisson) and uniformly distributed scenarios of events in the geographical
plane. We identify five load substations with the highest probability of failure in each
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Figure 3.14: Cascading behavior of the power grid for two scenarios of power-line failures in
the power grid shown in each sub-figure along with various distributions of five substations
with communication failures.

scenario and we assume that they are incapable of load shedding due to communication failures. We have selected the scenarios, which the value of rc/t (introduced in
Chapter 2) for them lies in the interval [0.9, 1). In other words, in this experiment
we have zoomed into the interval [0.9, 1) for the values of rc/t . We run Monte-Carlo
simulations for different realizations of three random initial transmission line failures for each scenario. For each of the transmission line failure realizations we carry
out 1,000 iterations, each with a realization of random selection of communication
failures as described above.
For better observability, the results obtained on four realizations of the initial
transmission-line failures are shown in Figs. 3.13 and 3.14. Similar behavior can be
seen in the rest of the samples. In each subfigure of Figs. 3.13 and 3.14, we have shown
the results on the number of failures due to cascading failures for each of the 1,000
realizations of the randomly and uniformly selected load buses with uncontrollable
loads with small blue dots. Note that each dot in each of the plots corresponds to one
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realization from all the combinations of five communication node failures as shown in
Fig. 3.13. As can be seen, the results show that both the topological location of power
line failures and the spatial distribution of failures in the communication system
affect the cascading behavior of the power grid. For example, the initial triggering
disturbance in Fig. 3.13(b) resulted in a more pronounced cascading phenomenon
compared to that in Fig. 3.13(a). Similarly, for a fixed distribution of the two initial
failures (fixed sub-plot), we observe a clear change in the cascading behavior as we
change the combination of communication failures.
Next, we have generated correlated communication failures using the simulation
framework based on point processes. In our simulations presented here, inhibition
refers to cases where the communication failures cannot be close to each other (e.g.,
closer than 50 miles) in a geographic sense, and clustering refers the cases where
communication failures are close to each other (e.g., within a radius of 20 miles). We
have assumed that IEEE 118-bus network is spanned over a 100 miles by 150 miles
area. We tested cascading failures with 250 realizations with clustering effect and
250 realizations with inhibition effect. However, we have selected 50 realizations from
each scenario such that the value of rc/t for such scenarios lies in the interval [0.9, 1).
These realizations are shown in Fig. 3.13: the square markers correspond to scenarios
with inhibition and circles correspond to the scenarios with clustering. We observe
that when there is clustering effect in the distribution of communication failures the
occurrence of cascading failures are less likely compared to the case in which there is
inhibition effect. This may be attributed to the ability of the power grid to isolate the
problem locally in the case when the uncontrollable buses are within close proximity
of one another, which may impede the propagation of subsequent failures through
the grid.
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3.4

Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, we developed a simulation framework that enables a systematic way
of simulating correlated failures. The presented approach is based on spatial point
processes, for representing stress centers on the geographical plane in order to facilitate the modeling of spatially inhomogeneous and correlated component failures in
system. Using Monte Carlo simulations with the proposed framework, we showed
that it is important to study the effects of spatial distribution of failures on reliability
of infrastructures. We showed that correlated failures in communication networks
have severe impact on the reliability of communication networks compared to random
failures. We also showed that correlations among failures in the communication system affects the reliability of the power grid through the interdependencies introduced
in Chapter 2. Interestingly, we observed that inhibition effect in the distribution of
communication failures have severe impact on cascading failures compared to the
clustering effect. Understanding the effects of distribution of failures in electriccyber infrastructures on their reliability is important in identification of vulnerable
points of the system as well as designing reliable control and communication systems
for future smart grids.
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Chapter 4
Markov chain framework for
cascading failures
In this chapter, a scalable and analytically tractable probabilistic model for the
stochastic dynamics of cascading failures in power grids is constructed while retaining key physical attributes and operating characteristics of the power grid. The
operating characteristics of the power grid are defined to include the interdependency
parameters, namely the load-shedding constraint level and the capacity estimation
error in addition to the power-grid loading level, all introduced in Chapter 2. The key
idea of the proposed framework is to simplify the state space of the complex power
system so that we can track the dynamics of cascading failures using a continuoustime Markov chain while capturing the effects of the omitted variables through the
transition probabilities and their parametric dependence on the physical attributes
and operating characteristics of the system. To do so, we define a reduced abstraction
of the state space of large scale power grids by defining a relatively small number of
equivalence classes of power-grid states. The aggregate state variables used in defining the reduced state space represent critical power-grid attributes, which have been
shown, from prior simulation-based and historical-databased analysis, to strongly
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influence the cascading behavior. We call the proposed framework Stochastic Abstract State Evolution (SASE) as it describes the stochastic dynamics of cascading
failures using the introduced abstract state space and the parametrized transition
rates. The transition rates among states are formulated in terms of certain parameters that capture grid’s operating characteristics. The model allows the prediction of
the evolution of blackout probability in time. Moreover, the asymptotic analysis (in
the limit as time tends to infinity) of the blackout probability enables the calculation
of the probability mass function of the blackout size. It is shown that the probability mass function of the blackout size has a heavy tail specifically when the grid
is operating under stress scenarios. We have specifically investigated the transition
probabilities for the Markov chain model that lead to a power-law distribution for
the blackout size. Further, a key benefit of the model is that it enables the characterization of the severity of cascading failures in terms of the operating characteristics
of the power grid.

4.1

State space and equivalence classes

In general, a large number of parameters, such as voltage and frequency at various
points in the grid, power-flow distribution, and the functionality of the grid’s components contribute to the definition of the state of the power grid at each time. As
such, detailed modeling of the state space of power grids for analytical modeling may
not be feasible due to its prohibitively large size. For instance, even in the case where
only the functionality status of the m transmission lines of the system are considered
to describe the state of the system, the size of the state space of the power grid is
exponential in m. The approach to overcome this challenge is to identify few key
parameters that govern the cascading behavior of the system.
Our power-system simulations as well as available historical blackout data [2, 4,
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Figure 4.1: Average size of blackouts, resulting from three initial line failures, as a function
of maximum capacity of the initial line failures for three different power-grid loading level.

80], together suggest that the functionality status of transmission lines and their
power-flow capacities [52] are key physical attributes that should be considered in
modeling cascading failures. Here, we present simulation results and two examples
of real scenarios of cascading failures that support the role of the number and the
capacity of the failed lines in cascading behavior of the system. The importance
of these attributes are clear as line failures have always been a part of historical
large blackouts and the capacity of transmission lines determine the power-delivery
capacity of the grid. The results of simulations of cascading failures in the IEEE 118
bus system shown in Fig. 4.1 indicate that the size of cascading failures increases as
a function of the capacity of the initial failures that trigger cascading failures.
Figure 4.2-a presents the time evolution of the cumulative line failures for the
blackouts in July 1996 and August 1996 in the Western Interconnection [4]. The
number of initial and final transmission-line failures are very close in these two blackouts. However, the approximate average line-failure rate in the July 1996 blackout
is 1.6 failures per minute during the escalation phase of the cascading failures, while
it is 4 failures per minute in the August 1996 blackout. Most notably, the initial
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative line failures in (a) July 1996 WSCC blackout (solid line), August
1996 WSCC blackout (dashed line), and (b) August 2003 blackout [2, 4]. The time of the
initial failure is set to zero. Figures are reproduced in the same way as in [5].

disturbance of the blackouts were two 345KV transmission-line failures in the July
1996 blackout and two 500KV transmission-line failures in the August 1996 blackout.
Next, the time evolution of the cumulative line failures for the blackout in the August
2003 in Eastern Interconnection [2] is shown in Fig. 4.2-b. Based upon the data, the
average line-failure rate is approximately 1.4 failures per minute at the beginning
phase while it is 18 failures per minute at the escalation phase of cascading failures.
This can be described by the larger number of failures in the grid in the second
phase as well as failure of some critical lines with high capacities. In summary, the
aforementioned observations extracted from historical data and our simulations both
support the selection of the capacity of the failed lines and the number of failures as
key players in the formulation of the abstract state space.
As such, we consider the following aggregate state variables to represent the
power-grid state. The first variable is the number of failed lines, F , which has been
commonly considered in the probabilistic modeling of cascading failures to represent
power-grid states [5, 17, 20, 53]. Next, we consider the maximum of the capacities of
all the failed lines, C max . As shown in the simulation results presented in Fig. 4.1,
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C max dominates the effect of the capacity of the failed lines in cascading failures.
In addition, our simulations presented in Fig. 4.3 indicate that certain power-grid
states are cascade-stable, defined as a state for which once entered no further failures
occur in the system. The simulations of cascading failures in the IEEE 118 bus
system and the IEEE 300 bus system shown in Fig. 4.3 show the probability that
certain states with specific F and C max are cascade stable. We will explain these
figures in more detail later in this chapter. According to the cascade-stable attributes
of certain states, we define a new aggregate state variable, termed cascade-stability,
which collectively captures many other physical attributes of the power grid (as the
physical attributes specify whether a power-grid state is cascade-stable or not). We
represent the cascade-stability by a binary state variable I, where I = 1 indicates a
cascade-stable state and I = 0 indicates otherwise.
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Figure 4.3: (a) Probability of cascade-stability for states as a function of Fi and (b) probability of cascade-stability for states as a function of (Cimax ) for the IEEE 118-bus system
and the IEEE 300-bus system for r = 0.7, e = 0.1, and θ = 0.

By utilizing the three introduced state variables as the descriptors of power-grid
states, we partition the space of all detailed power-grid states into a collection of
equivalence classes denoted by S. Such coarse partitioning of the state space of the
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power grid implies that detailed power-grid states with the same aggregate statevariable values (i.e., the same value of F , C max and I) will belong to one class and
will be indistinguishable as far as the reduced abstraction is concerned. We term each
class of the power-grid states an abstract power-grid state or in short an abstract state,
and label each as Si = (Fi , Cimax , Ii ), where Si ∈ S.

Figure 4.4: Power-grid states, abstract states and transitions between the abstract states.

The notion of power-grid states, abstract states, and transition between the abstract states is sketched in Fig. 4.4. Each large circle represents an abstract state
and each of the four topological graphs inside each large circle represents a detailed
power-grid state, albeit with common values for F , C max and I. We assume that
the power-flow capacity of the lines can be quantized into a discrete and finite set
of capacity values, i.e., C = {C1 , C2 , ..., CK }. Thus, the cardinality of the abstractstate space S is N = 2Km. Therefore, the equivalence-class approach reduces the
complexity associated with tracking the stochastic dynamics of the power grid from
exponential (when considering the functionality status of every line in the system)
to linear in m.
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4.2

Stochastic Abstract State Evolution model

The Stochastic Abstract State Evolution (SASE) model describes the stochastic dynamics of cascading failures using a finite state continuous-time Markov chain whose
state space is defined by the abstract states Si = (Fi , Cimax , Ii ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Recall that the state variable I indicates whether a state is cascade-stable; hence, it
is utilized to specify the absorbing (I = 1) and non-absorbing (I = 0) states of the
Markov chain. We term the non-absorbing states as transitory states. We reiterate
that with this definition of the state, there are two abstract states associated with
any power-grid state: one is an absorbing state and the other is a transitory state.
The definition of absorbing states in the state space of the Markov chain enables
modeling of cascading failures, which can be terminated (with some probability) at
any power-grid state with any Fi and Cimax instead of continuing to induce further
failures. In contrast, a pure birth chain model [81] with positive upward transition
probabilities, in which each birth represents a new failure in the system, has a single
absorbing state (due to the finite size of the system) corresponding to the complete
failure of the system. As such, models like the pure-birth chain model are not effective in modeling the real world cascading failures as the real failure scenarios also
suggest that depending on control actions and islands formed in the system, cascading failures may result in different size of failures [4]. The definition of the absorbing
states in the presented Markov chain framework enables modeling of various sizes of
blackouts in the system by modeling stable states in the system, which the system
may enter with certain probability. On the other hand, the pure-birth model does
not allow for different blackout sizes. Another way of capturing the effects of stable
states in the state-space of the system is by defining partially absorbing states, which
the system never leaves such states with certain probability. We will introduce and
use the latter definition in Chapter 5.
We consider two types of state transitions in the SASE model. The first type
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is termed as cascade-stop transition, which is from a transitory state, say Si , to an
absorbing state, say Sj , (i.e., Ii = 0 and Ij = 1) such that Fj = Fi and Cjmax =
Cimax . The cascade-stop transition leads to the end of the chain of failures, which
in real systems can occur as a result of the implementation of successful control
actions, formation of operating islands in the power grid, or occurrence of a large
blackout. The second type of transitions is termed a cascade-continue transition.
We assume that the cascade-continue transition occurs as a result of a single line
failure in the system. The single-failure-per-transition approximation is based upon
the assumption that time is divided into sufficiently small intervals such that each
interval can allow only a single failure event. By cascade-continue transition we mean
transition from a transitory state, say Si , to another transitory state, say Sj (i.e.,
Ii = Ij = 0) such that Fj = Fi + 1 and Cjmax ≥ Cimax . To this end, the cascading
failure can be described as a sequence of Markovian transitions among transitory
states with a final transition to some absorbing state.
We represent the state of the system at time t ≥ 0 by X(t), an S-valued,
continuous-time Markov chain. The transition probability matrix of the chain X(t)
is denoted by P(t), where its ijth element is pij (t) = P{X(τ + t) = Sj |X(τ ) = Si },
t ≥ 0. Note that the notation P is used to represent probability measure defined on
the collection (σ-algebra) F of all events (subsets of the sample space Ω) generated
by the random variables defined in this dissertation.
Let qij for i 6= j represents the probability rate of transition from state Si to
state Sj , which depends upon the origin and destination states of the transition.
This dependency allows for cascading behavior and will be explained in details in
Section 4.3. The qij is defined as

 lim + pij (h)
h→0
h
qij =
 − limh→0+ 1−pij (h)
h

where qii satisfies qii = −

PN

j=1,j6=i qij

for i 6= j
for i = j

,

(4.1)

[81]. A Markov chain X(t) is completely
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determined by the transition rate matrix Q with qij as its ijth element.
We formulate the transition rates of the SASE model based upon the transition
probabilities of its embedded Markov chain (EMC). We denote the state of the EMC
at discrete time instant ℓ by X (ℓ) . The one-step transition probability matrix of
the EMC is denoted by PEMC . According to the definition of the SASE model, the
elements of PEMC have the following form


0
Fj < Fi or Fj − Fi > 1 or





Cjmax < Cimax or (Ii = 1 and j 6= i)
pEMC
=
,
ij


1
I
=
1
and
j
=
i
i




Ptrans (Si , Sj ) otherwise

(4.2)

where Ptrans (Si , Sj ) represents the probability that the system transits from a transitory state, say Si , to state Sj for which the value of Fj and Cjmax does not violate
the transition rules in (4.2). In Section 4.3, we will parametrically characterize
Ptrans (Si , Sj ) based upon our observations from simulations.
We approximate qij based upon (4.1) and for a small ∆t as qij ≈

pEMC
ij
∆t

for i 6=

j. We consider ∆t as (the small) unit of time approximating the average time
between failures during the rapid escalation phase of the cascading behavior, which
is relatively small compared to the total duration of cascading failures. We estimate
such ∆t using the historical blackout data provided in [4,5]. Note however that based
upon the individual blackout events, ∆t may vary depending on the power system
and its operating characteristics. For example, historical data suggest approximately
18 transmission-line failures per minute on average during the rapid escalation phase
of the cascading failure for the August 2003 Eastern Interconnection blackout (∆t ≈
0.055 min) [4] while this number is 4 failures per minute for the August 1996 Western
Interconnection blackout (∆t ≈ 0.25 min) [5]. In our calculations we have selected an
intermediate value of ∆t = 0.1 min. We emphasize that while we consider a fixed ∆t
for the system, it is the state-dependent nature of the transition probabilities, pEMC
ij ,
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that inherently adjusts the transition rates to accommodate all phases of cascading
failures, such as the precursor and escalation phases.
In the next section, we use our power-system simulation methodology introduced
in Chapter 2 for parametric formulation of pEMC
ij .

4.3

Parametric modeling of transition rates

In this section, we parametrically model Ptrans (Si , Sj ) introduced in (4.2). In order to
simplify the formulation of the Ptrans (Si , Sj ), we consider the probability components
depicted in Fig. 4.5. We will introduce the components represented in Fig. 4.5 as we
go through this section and refer to this figure as necessary.

Figure 4.5: The components of Ptrans (Si , Sj ). First, transition from a transitory state Si
is divided into two categories: transition to an absorbing state Si∗ and transition to a
transitory state (states in the dashed circles are transitory states). Next, the transition
to a transitory state is also divided into two categories: transition to a state Si∗∗ with the
same C max values as that of Si , and transition to a state whose maximum capacity of the
failed lines is larger than C max associated with the state Si .
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Note that for every transitory state, say Si ∈ S, there is a single associated
absorbing state, which we denote by Si∗ (see Fig. 4.5). Note that state Si∗ has the
same F and C max values as those for Si but it has Ii∗ = 1 (where as Ii = 0).
Based upon whether the next state of the transition is an absorbing state or not, we
decompose the transition probability as follows:
Ptrans (Si , Sj )=
P{X (ℓ+1)=Sj |X (ℓ)=Si , X (ℓ+1)=Si∗ }P{X (ℓ+1)=Si∗ |X (ℓ)=Si }
+P{X (ℓ+1)=Sj |X (ℓ)=Si , X (ℓ+1)6=Si∗ }P{X (ℓ+1)6=Si∗ |X (ℓ)=Si }.

(4.3)

Note that X (ℓ+1) = Si∗ implies that cascading failure ends in the system. As
△

such, we define the probability of cascade-stop transition as Pstop (Si ) = P{X (ℓ+1) =
Si∗ |X (ℓ) =Si }. Clearly, P{X (ℓ+1) =Sj |X (ℓ) =Si , X (ℓ+1) =Si∗ } = δSi∗ ,Sj , where δSi∗ ,Sj = 1
when Sj is equal to Si∗ and δSi∗ ,Sj = 0 otherwise. Moreover, we define P{X (ℓ+1) =
△

Sj |X (ℓ) =Si , X (ℓ+1) 6=Si∗ } = (1 − δSi∗ ,Sj )Pcont (Si , Sj ), where Pcont (Si , Sj ) is the conditional cascade-continue transition probability. Thus, we rewrite (4.3) as
Ptrans (Si , Sj ) = δSi∗ ,Sj Pstop (Si )
+ (1 − δSi∗ ,Sj )Pcont (Si , Sj )(1 − Pstop (Si )),
for Si , Si∗ , Sj ∈ S. Note that

PN

j=1

(4.4)

Ptrans (Si , Sj ) = 1.

The rest of this section is devoted to the parametric representation of Pstop (Si )
and Pcont (Si , Sj ), and therefore, the parametric formulation of Ptrans (Si , Sj ) due to
(4.4).

4.3.1

Cascade-stop probability

In this section, we present simulation results that show the dependency of Pstop (Si ) on
Fi and Cimax . To simplify the observation of the effects of Fi and Cimax on Pstop (Si ), we
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have studied Pstop (Si ) as a function of Fi and Cimax individually represented, respec(1)

(2)

tively, by Pstop (Fi ) and Pstop (Cimax ). In Appendix A, we present a simple approach
similar to the approach presented in [82] in conjunction with certain reasonable
assumptions (originated from the simulations of the power grid and power grid characteristics) to approximately represent Pstop (Si ) in terms of a weighted superposition
(1)

(2)

of Pstop (Fi ) and Pstop (Cimax ) as
(1)

(2)

Pstop (Si ) = wPstop (Fi ) + (1 − w)Pstop (Cimax ),

(4.5)

where in our formulation we simply set w = 0.5.

stop

i

Cascade−stop probability, P(1) (F )

1
0.8

θ=0
θ = 0.1
θ = 0.2
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Number of line failures, F

200

i

(1)

Figure 4.6: Simulation results of Pstop (Fi ) for r = 0.7, e = 0.1 and three values of θ. The
solid line is the parametric approximated function when θ = 0.

(1)

(2)

Figures 4.3-a and 4.3-b show the simulation results of Pstop (Fi ) and Pstop (Cimax ),
respectively, for the IEEE 118-bus and the IEEE 300-bus systems. The IEEE 118-bus
system has 186 transmission lines and the IEEE 300-bus systems has 411 transmission
(1)

(2)

lines. Note that Pstop (Fi ) and Pstop (Cimax ) exhibit the same general behavior in both
grids. Due to the space constraints, we will limit our presentation to the IEEE 118bus system with the knowledge that a similar approach for the parametric modeling
of transmission rates can be applied to larger scale grids by adjusting the parameters
of the model.
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Figure 4.7: Simulation results of Pstop (Cimax ) for r = 0.7, e = 0.1 and three values of θ.
The solid line is the parametric approximated function when θ = 0.

(1)

(2)

Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the simulation results of Pstop (Fi ) and Pstop (Cimax ) for
the IEEE 118-bus system, respectively, for different operating settings of the grid.
The results of our simulations are obtained using 1,000 scenarios of random initial
disturbances with two or three random line failures. We considered three different
values of load-shedding constraint level θ in order to show that operating characteristics of the power grid affect the stability probabilities while the value of r and
e are fixed to be 0.7 and 0.1, respectively (the effects of r, and e are discussed in
Section 4.3.3).
(1)

From Fig. 4.6, we observe that Pstop (Fi ) is bowl shaped, with three identifiable
phases, which are described in detail below. The importance of the bowl-shape form
is that it reflects the general cascading behavior as failures accumulate. Similar threephase behavior can be observed in the historical cascading-failure data presented in
Fig. 4.2. Specifically, we will revisit the bowl-shape function in Section 4.5.1.1 and explain that the bowl-shape form for the cascade-stable probability generally increases
the size of large blackouts and leads to heavy-tail property for the distribution of the
blackout size.
First phase– This phase represents the regime when the likelihood of an additional
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failure increases substantially as a function of the number of failures. A qualitatively
similar increase in the failure propagation probability has also been observed by
Dobson [20]. This phase starts at Fi = 2 (due to N-1 criterion). To this end,
(1)

we define the parameter a1 as Pstop (2), which represents, intuitively speaking, the
reliability of the power grid to initial disturbances with two failures. Also in the first
(1)

(1)

phase, Pstop (Fi ) decreases from a1 to a small Pstop (Fi ) value, ǫ (our results suggest
ǫ = 0.05), as the number of failures increases and reaches a critical Fi = a2 m value.
Second phase– This phase represents the escalated phase of cascading failures.
(1)

(1)

During this phase Pstop (Fi ) is small (we assume Pstop (Fi ) = ǫ during this phase) and
the power grid is highly vulnerable. This phase starts at Fi = a2 m, which represents
the number of failures in the power grid after which the cascading failure enters the
escalated phase. As expected, our results show that during this phase the efficiency
(1)

of the control action (represented by θ) hardly affects Pstop (Fi ).
Third phase– As Fi increases further, the probability of having an additional
failure decreases as cascading-failure behavior begins to phase out. This behavior can
be attributed to the finite size of the power grid or the fact that as more failures occur
“functional islands” may form in the grid, leading to the termination of cascading
(1)

(1)

failures. Therefore, in this phase the value of Pstop (Fi ) rises and finally Pstop (m) = 1.
Note that here we simply consider a fixed parametric model for the third phase of
(1)

Pstop (Fi ), which only roughly approximates the average scenario of various operating
settings.
We propose the following parametric model to capture the three aforementioned
(1)

phases in Pstop (Fi ):
 
4
a2 m−Fi


+ǫ
2 ≤ Fi ≤ a2 m
a
1

a2 m

(1)
Pstop (Fi ) =
ǫ
a2 m < Fi ≤ 0.6m .

o
n



 min Fi −0.6m 4 + ǫ, 1 0.6m < Fi ≤ m
m−0.6m
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(1)

The parametric Pstop (Fi ) is shown in Fig. 4.6 for θ = 0. Recall that we have judiciously selected a common parametric model for the third phase of the bowl-shaped
function across various operating settings. Consequently, the parametric function
(1)

Pstop (Fi ) shown in Fig. 4.6 does not accurately match the simulation results for
θ = 0 scenario in the third phase.
(2)

(2)

The empirically calculated Pstop (Cimax ) is shown in Fig. 4.7. The value of Pstop (Cimax )
indicates, intuitively speaking, the reliability of the power grid when the maximum
(2)

capacity of the failed lines in the grid is Cimax . Note that Pstop (Cimax ) decreases as
Cimax increases, which means that the power grid is more vulnerable to additional
failures when it has lost at least a line with a large capacity value. We also observe
(2)

that Pstop (Cimax ) decreases for all Cimax values as θ increases; however, the effect of
θ on the reliability is larger when Cimax is smaller. This is because control actions
are most effective when they are implemented in the beginning phase of cascading
failures where C max is more likely to be small.
(2)

The Pstop (Cimax ) is formulated parametrically as

(2)
Pstop (Cimax )

(

= max a3

(2)



Cimax − max{C}
max{C}

4

, a4

)

,

(4.7)

(2)

where a3 , Pstop (min{C}) and a4 , Pstop (max{C}). The parametric function of
(2)

Pstop (Cimax ) is also shown (in solid line) in Fig. 4.7. This completes the parametric modeling of Pstop (Si ) based on (4.5). In Section 4.3.3 we show that the value
of a1 , ..., a4 are affected by r, e, and θ. In the SASE model we will perceive the
parameters a1 , ..., a4 beyond abstract model parameters but as parameters that govern the cascading behavior while maintaining a physical connection to the operating
characteristics of the system.
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Figure 4.8: Simulation results of Phc (Si ) as a function of Fi and Cimax for r = 0.7, e = 0.1
and θ = 0.1.
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lines.

4.3.2

Cascade-continue probability

Recall that for every transitory state Si there is only one transitory state with the
same C max as that of state Si and exactly one more failure than that for state Si . We
denote such state by Si∗∗ (see Fig. 4.5). Failure of a line with capacity smaller than
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or equal to Cimax results in transitioning from state Si to state Si∗∗ . Similarly to (4.3),
depending on whether the next line failure has larger capacity than Cimax or not, we
can write the conditional cascade-continue transition probability by conditioning on
Si∗∗ as
Pcont (Si , Sj ) = (1 − Phc (Si ))δSi∗∗ ,Sj
+ (1 − δSi∗∗ ,Sj )PC max (Si , Sj )Phc (Si ),

(4.8)

for Si , Si∗∗ , Sj ∈ S and Ij = 0, where Phc is defined as the probability of having
a line failure that results in a higher capacity of the failed lines than Cimax . In
△

△

(4.8) Phc (Si ) = P{X (ℓ+1) 6=Si∗∗ |X (ℓ) =Si , X (ℓ+1) 6=Si∗ } and (1 − δSi∗∗ ,Sj )PC max (Si , Sj ) =
P{X (ℓ+1)=Sj |X (ℓ)=Si , X (ℓ+1)6=Si∗∗ , X (ℓ+1)6=Si∗ }.
The empirically calculated Phc (Si ) as a function of Fi and Cimax is shown in Fig. 4.8
with the same simulation settings as that of the previous subsection. Our simulation
results show strong evidence that Fi and Cimax affect Phc (Si ). Results suggest that
regardless of the Cimax value of the power-grid state, as Fi increases the probability
that a line with capacity larger than Cimax fails increases. This is meaningful because
as the number of failures increases the power grid becomes vulnerable and hence
large transmission lines may be affected by contingencies. Moreover, the ratio of the
number of transmission lines with capacity larger than Cimax to the total number of
functional lines increases with Fi . The next general observation from Fig. 4.8 is that
for the same Fi value, as Cimax increases the probability that a line with capacity
larger than Cimax fails decreases. This is mainly due to decrease in the number of
lines with capacity value larger than Cimax (as Cimax increases). Furthermore, it is
less likely to have states with Cimax value after Fi reaches a certain threshold denoted
by Γi (the value of Γi increases as Cimax increases). This means that as Fi approaches
Γi , line failures with capacity larger than Cimax become highly likely.
Based upon our simulations the role of θ, r and e in Phc (Si ) is subtle. Therefore,
here we approximate Phc (Si ) for different operating characteristics of the power grid
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with a fixed function. The above trends in Phc (Si ) are captured by:

 α(F + β)3 2 ≤ F ≤ Γ
i
i
i
Phc (Si ) =
,
 1
Γi < Fi

(4.9)

for Si ∈ S, where α = 6 × 10−7 and β is Cimax dependent. The parametric Phc (Si )s
are shown in Fig. 4.8. Note that the over-estimation of the curves in Fig. 4.8 is due
to employing a common parametric model for various operating settings as well as
the introduced parameter Γi (there is no simulation data when Fi is beyond Γi .)
Next, we find the parametric formulation for PC max (Si , Sj ). Our simulation results
suggest that Cimax and Cjmax play key roles in determining PC max (Si , Sj ). Figure 4.9
shows the empirically calculated PC max (Si , Sj ) as a function of Cimax and Cjmax . From
Fig. 4.9 we observe that conditional on the occurrence of an additional failure with
capacity larger than Cimax the probability of transitioning to state Sj decreases as
Cjmax increases. The results suggest that lines with capacity value close to Cimax have

a higher probability of failure than those with much larger capacities than Cimax .
We also observe that the probability of transitioning to state Sj increases as Cimax
increases. This is because the power grid becomes more vulnerable when Cimax is
large. By comparing the simulation results correspond to two values of θ in Fig. 4.9
we conclude that role of θ in PC max (Si , Sj ) is also subtle and similarly to Phc (Si ), the
effect of operating characteristics on PC max (Si , Sj ) is not considered. To capture the
described trends, PC max (Si , Sj ) is modeled parametrically as
PC max (Si , Sj ) =

w(C max )
P j
,
w(Ck )

(4.10)

k:Ck >Cimax

where w(Ck ) is what we term the weight of transition to a state with the maximum
capacity of the failed line equal to Ck . We have assigned these weights such that
they approximate the simulation results presented in Fig. 4.9 using (4.10). Here, the
value of the weights are set to w(80MW) = 2.2, w(200MW) = 1.5, w(500MW) = 0.5,
and w(1500MW) = 0.01. This completes the modeling of pEMC
presented in (4.2).
ij
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Figure 4.10: SASE-model parameters (a) a1 , (b) a2 , (c) a3 , and (d) a4 as a function of r
parameterized by e.

4.3.3

Effects of operating characteristics on parameters of
the SASE model

The SASE model parameters a1 , ..., a4 determine different cascading behaviors. These
parameters may vary under different operating conditions and also across different
power grids due to different connectivity pattern and components characteristics. Recall that we made the general observation that the power grid is more reliable when
a1 , ..., a4 are larger. To illustrate the effects of operating characteristics on a1 , ..., a4 ,
the values of these parameters (obtained based upon simulation results) are shown
in Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.11 for different values of the load-shedding constraint level θ,
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Figure 4.11: SASE-model parameters (a) a1 , (b) a2 , (c) a3 , and (d) a4 as a function of e
parameterized by θ.

the power-grid loading level r and the transmission capacity estimation error e. Our
simulation results suggest that the power grid is more reliable (a1 , ..., a4 are larger)
when r, e, and θ are small. We observe that when any of the r, e, and θ parameter
increase they add more stress to the system and the effect of contingencies becomes
larger. Therefore, the probability of an additional failure in the system increases
(a1 , a3 , and a4 decrease). We also observe that when any of r, e, or θ increase, the
cascading failure enters the rapid escalation phase with smaller number of failures
(a2 decreases).
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4.4

Analysis of the SASE model

In this section, we analyze the SASE model by understanding the properties of the
transition probability matrix P(t). To simplify the analysis, we first rearrange the
indices of states in S by following three simple rules so that Q becomes upper diagonal
matrix denoted by Qd . The three rules pertain the indices of states in Qd such that:
(1) i < j if Fi < Fj ; (2) i < j if Fi = Fj but Cimax < Cjmax ; and (3) j = i + 1 if
Fi = Fj and Cimax = Cjmax , but Ii = 0 and Ij = 1. Note that the SASE Markov
chain is not irreducible (and hence not ergodic) because Qd is upper diagonal. This
further implies that there is no stationary distribution for the SASE model and the
canonical limit theorems of ergodic Markov chains are not applicable. Regardless,
P(t) is governed by
P′ (t) = Qd P(t),

(4.11)

where P′ (t) denotes the matrix whose elements are time derivative of pij (t) [81].
d

In principle, the solution of (4.11) is given by P(t) = eQ t P(0). While the numerical solutions of P(t) can be easily obtained, to have better insight we pursue
an analytical approach which can result in the asymptotic solution of P(t). To
do so, the eigenvalues λ1 , λ2 , . . . , λN of Qd and a complete system of associated
right eigenvectors u1 , u2 , . . . , uN need to be determined. Then, P(t) can be repdt

resented as P(t) = eQ

= UΛ(t)V, where U is the matrix whose column vectors

are u1 , u2 , . . . , uN and V = U−1 . The matrix Λ(t) is diagonal with eλi t as its ith
diagonal element.
Due to the upper diagonal form of Qd and by carrying out simple matrix manipulations, we can express pij (t) as
pij (t) = βij +

X

αik eλk t ,

(4.12)

i<k<j
△

△

where βij = U(i, j)V(j, j) and αik = U(i, k)V(i, k). Notice that V(j, j) = 1/U(j, j)
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for j = 1, 2, . . . , N. Since Qd is upper diagonal λk is negative for all k, and hence
limt→∞ pij (t) = βij .
Further, using the asymptotic analysis, we can derive the conditional probability
that a power grid eventually reaches a state with n failures from an initial state Si
defined as
△

D(n|Si ) =

X

j∈Jn

lim pij (t) =

t→∞

X

βij .

(4.13)

j∈Jn

Hence, the probability mass function (PMF) of the blackout size, conditional on the
initial state, can be computed by calculating D(n|Si ) for n = Fi , . . . , m.
Now, let B(t, M|Si ) be the conditional probability of reaching a state with M
or more failures by time t starting from an initial state Si . Then B(t, M|Si ) can be
obtained as follows:
B(t, M|Si ) =

m X
X

pij (t),

(4.14)

n=M j∈Jn
△

where Jn represents the set of indices of states with n failures, i.e., Jn = {j : Fj =
n}. B(t, M|Si ) estimates the evolution of the risk of cascading failures in time.
Theorem 4.4.1 represents a more elegant representation of B(t, M|Si ) with a system
of differential equations. Before stating Theorem 4.4.1, we introduce the notation
used in this theorem. Recall that Pstop (Si ) represents the cascade-stop probability
introduced in Section 4.3.1, γW represents the transition rate corresponding to (1 −
Phc (Si )), γUj represents the transition rate corresponding to Phc (Si )PC max (Si , S uj )
P
and γ = j∈J γUj + γW . Further, S W and S uj denote states with the same C max as

the initial state Si and with larger C max than the initial state Si , respectively. Here,

if Cf represents the capacity of the new failure in the system then the subscript j in
△

Uj is for j ∈ J , where J = {j|Cf = Cj , Cj ∈ C and Cj > C max }.
Theorem 4.4.1. The probability of reaching a blackout of size M or larger in a time
interval t and from an initial state Si (with Fi < M) is characterized by the following
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system of differential equation:

dB(t, M|Si )
= −γB(t, M|Si ) + (1 − Pstop (Si )) γW B(t, M|S w )
dt

X
uj
+
γUj B(t, M|S ) ,
j

(4.15)
with the following initial conditions:
B(t, M|Si ) = 1, if Fi ≥ M.

(4.16)

The approach to prove Theorem 4.4.1 is based on regeneration theory presented
in Chapter 5. We will therefore postpone the proof of Theorem 4.4.1 to Chapter 5.
As the probability of reaching blackout for a power-grid state Si is expressed based
on the probability of reaching a blackout starting form states S uj and S w , we have
a set of coupled differential equations which must be solved simultaneously. We can
also use asymptotic analysis to derive the asymptotic behavior of B(t, M|S) based
on (4.13) as following:
△

ρi (M) = lim B(t, M|Si ) =
t→∞

4.5

m
X

D(n|Si ).

(4.17)

n=M

Analytical results

In this section, we present results obtained from the SASE model applied to IEEE118 bus system.

4.5.1

Conditional blackout probability

The PMF of the blackout size conditional on the initial state, D(n|Si ), is calculated
using (4.13) and shown in Fig. 4.12 for a fixed initial state with Fi = 2 and Cimax =
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20MW. Figure 4.12 also shows the effects of the operating characteristics of the
power grid on D(n|Si ). The results suggest that when the power grid operates
under a reliable operating configuration (small values of r, e and θ) the PMF of the
blackout size shows an exponential decay, which has also been observed empirically
by Dobson (see Figs. 1, 2 in [20]) using real outage datasets [80]. On the other hand,
when the power grid is stressed (large values of r, e and θ) the probability of large
blackouts increases and a hump appears near the tail of the PMF. Note that the
hump represents a heavy tail property in the distribution of the blackout size. The
analysis of historical blackout data [1, 39, 83] has been suggested that the PMF of
the blackout size for power grids has a heavy tail property, specifically, when they
are operating close to their critical limits (see Fig. 1.1). Another example of the
heavy tail distributions is the power-law distribution, which has gained attention
as it is attributed to the complex system dynamics. We will discuss the power-law
distribution of the blackout size in Section 4.5.1.1.
These conclusions from the analytical SASE model are confirmed by powersystem simulation results as shown in Fig. 4.13. Note that the set of simulation
results used to validate these conditional probabilities are different from the set of
results used to identify the model parameters. All in all, these results validate that
the SASE model with its low-dimensional, abstract state space is effective in capturing the dynamics of cascading failures in the power grid.
Note that the average size of cascading failures is approximately four in the
scenario without stress (Fig. 4.13-a) while this number is approximately 61 in the
scenario with stress (Fig. 4.13-b). Therefore, one could use the SASE model to characterize the conditions for occurrence of large blackouts by identifying the operating
characteristics that result in a heavy tail PMF for the size of failures.
Next, consider the conditional probability of reaching a blackout state with at
least M failures from an initial state Si , i.e., ρi (M), as introduced in (4.17). For a
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Figure 4.13: The analytical and empirical conditional PMF of the blackout size (a) without
stress, i.e., r = 0.7, e = 0.25 and θ = 0, and (b) with stress, i.e., r = 0.7, e = 0.35 and
θ = 0.2, for the initial state with Fi = 2 and Cimax = 20MW.

fixed M and Fi = 2 and Cimax = 20MW, the dependence of ρi (M) on r and e is
shown in Fig. 4.16-a and on e and θ in Fig. 4.16-b. As expected, ρi (M) increases
with r, e, and θ. The results also suggest that at certain settings of the operating
characteristics, a phase transition occurs in the blackout probability. This represents
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the critical operating settings for which the power grid becomes highly vulnerable to
cascading failures.

4.5.1.1

A discussion on the power-law distribution

Power grids are believed to exhibit some attributes associated with complex systems
[1, 39, 83]. It has been suggested that the PMF of the blackout size for these systems
has a heavy tail, specifically, when they are operated near their critical limits. In the
analytical results presented in Fig. 4.12 we showed that the PMF of the blackout size
has a heavy tail when the operating characteristics of the power grid introduce stress
to the system and the size of the hump at the tail increases as the stress increases in
the system.
Another example of the heavy tail distributions is the power-law distribution,
which has gained attention as it is attributed to complex-system dynamics. In this
subsection, we identify attributes of the transition probabilities for the Markov chain
modeling cascading failures that lead to the power-law distribution for the blackout
size. To simplify the analysis, we simplify the SASE model to a Markov chain that
considers the number of failures F and stability variable I as the state variables.
This simplified Markov chain model is presented in Fig. 4.14.

Figure 4.14: A simplified Markov chain model with F and I state variables, which models
the stochastic dynamics of cascading failures in a power grid.
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Recall that in Section 4.3.1 we described how power-system simulations produce
a bowl-shape form for the cascade-stop probability as a function of number of failures
(1)

in the system, i.e., Pstop (Fi ). The attributes of the bowl-shape function depend on
the operating characteristics of the power grid (see Fig. 4.6). In this subsection, by
using the simplified Markov-chain model presented in Fig. 4.14, we back calculate the
cascade-stop probability Pstop (Fi ) for the model that precisely results in the powerlaw distribution for the blackout size. Interestingly, we will show that the numerically
calculated Pstop (Fi ), based on this simplified analytical model, is necessarily of a
bowl-shape form for Pstop (Fi ); the detail is given below.
As before, we denote the probability of a blackout with n failures by D(n|Si ),
which can be easily derived in the following difference equation using the model
presented in Fig. 4.14,
D(n + 1|Si ) =

Pstop (n + 1)(1 − Pstop (n))
D(n|Si ).
Pstop (n)

(4.18)

If we assume, without loss of generality, that the initial state of the power grid has
one failure with I = 0, i.e., Si = (1, 0), then the boundary condition for (4.18) is
D(1|Si ) = Pstop (1)
Based on (4.18) if the transition probabilities of the Markov chain are constant,
i.e., Pstop (Fi ) is constant, then the chain can model cascading failures in a system
for which the PMF of the blackout size follows an exponential distribution. Next,
to identify the Pstop (Fi ) function which results in a power-law distribution for the
blackout size, we input the values of D(n|Si ) using the corresponding values of the
PMF of a discrete power-law distribution, namely Zipf’s law. The PMF of this
distribution is as follows
1
P (n, s, m) = Pm

−s
i=1 i

n−s ,

(4.19)

where s is the parameter of the distribution and m is the number of lines in the power
grid. In other words, we set D(n|Si ) = P (n, s, m), where s is the free parameter of the
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Figure 4.15: (a) PMF of the blackout size, D(n|Si ), in log-log scale following the power-law
distribution with various s parameters, and (b) Pstop (Fi ) function deduced from D(n|Si )s
of part (a).

model. We have shown the distribution of blackout size, i.e., D(n|Si ) = P (n, s, m),
for different values of n and s in log-log scale in Fig. 4.15-a.
As mentioned in [1,39] the NERC historical data indicates a power law scaling of
blackout frequency, when the blackout is measured by unserved energy and the powerlaw exponent s of this scaling is approximately between 0.6 to 1.9. Many probabilistic
models have attempted to capture the power-law behavior for the distribution of
size of failures in cascading failures [5, 14]. For instance, the PMF of failures for the
CASCADE model presented in [14] is a power law distribution with exponent 1.4.
We have numerically calculated Pstop (Fi ) using the difference equation in (4.18)
for the distributions shown in Fig. 4.15-a. The results for function Pstop (Fi ) are
shown in Fig. 4.15-b. An important point to notice here is that the results presented
in Fig. 4.15-b using the difference equation (4.18) also represent a bowl-shape function similar to the one plotted using power-system simulations in Fig. 4.6. Due to
the lack of sufficient parameters that parametrically model the simulation results in
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Figure 4.16: Conditional blackout probability ρi (M ) for M = 40 as a function of (a) r
parameterized by e, and (b) e parameterized by θ, for the initial state with Fi = 2 and
Cimax = 20MW.

Fig. 4.6, we cannot fit the parameters of the SASE model to the bowl-shape functions obtained here; however, based on the results presented in Section 4.3.3, we
can conjecture that the attributes of the bowl-shape function depend on the operating characteristics of the power grid and thus certain operating characteristic of the
system may lead to the bowl-shape functions that obtained in this subsection. Further, we conclude that the bowl-shape behavior for the state-dependent transition
probabilities Pstop (Fi ) increases the probability of larger blackouts. In particular,
certain bowl-shape functions result in the power-law distribution for the PMF of the
blackout size. Moreover, as the simulation results in Fig. 4.6 suggest certain operating characteristics of the system set the system in critical conditions that lead to a
heavy tail, specifically, the power-law distribution for the blackout size. We wish to
emphasize here that the state-dependent transition probabilities are key elements of
the Markov chain framework for modeling cascading failures to capture a wide range
of stochastic behaviors for complex systems such as power grids.
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4.5.2

Conditional blackout probability as a function of time

The numerical results of the conditional blackout probability B(t, M|Si ) are calculated using (4.11) and (4.14). The same results can be obtained using Theorem 4.4.1.
As a representative example, we have calculated B(t, 30|Si ) for r = 0.7, e = 0.2 and
θ = 0.1 for different initial states, Si , as shown in Fig. 4.17. As the results show,
the values of Fi and Cimax associated with the initial state affect the evolution of the
blackout probability. In particular, both the probability of reaching a power-grid
state with M or more failures and its rate of change during escalation phase increase
with Fi and Cimax . We reiterate that while we have assumed a single-line failure
at a time in our model, the escalation phase in the cascading failure occurs as a
result of shorter time between failures due to higher transition rates for such states
(as the transition rates are state dependent). Also, note that B(t, M|Si ) exhibits
three phases. Interestingly, the three-phase theme of cascading failures were also
seen in the behavior of the cascade-stop probability as well as the evolution of the
accumulative number of failures.
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Figure 4.17: Probability of reaching a blackout, B(t, M |Si ), with M = 30 or more failures
for r = 0.7, e = 0.2, θ = 0.1, and initial states (a) with Fi = 3, and (b) with Fi = 6, and
different values of Cimax .
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4.5.3

Failure evolution

Figure 4.18 shows four realizations of the cascading-failure scenarios in terms of the
evolution of the cumulative number of failures obtained using the SASE Markov
chain. The initial state of the power grid in all the four realizations has two line
failures with Cimax = 80MW. Note that in the realization with 163 eventual failures,
the number of failures increases relatively gently at the beginning; however, failure
of a line with large capacity at t = 10 min results in rapid increase in the number of
failures in the power grid. In contrast, the number of failures in other realizations
increases rapidly right from the beginning but they transit to stable state earlier as
the value of Pstop (Si ) in these cases is larger. Note that from Fig. 4.18 we observe
similar forms to those shown in Fig. 4.2 for the historical blackouts.
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Figure 4.18: Realizations of the evolution of the cumulative line failures using the SASE
model for r = 0.7, e = 0.2, θ = 0.1, Fi = 2, and Cimax = 80MW.

4.5.4

Size of cascading failures

To assess the severity of cascading failures we consider the number of subsequent
failures induced by each initial failure. For a given initial state Si with Fi initial
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△

failures, we define RSi = (Fi − Fiend )/Fi , where Fiend is the random variable for the
final number of failures in the power grid after cascading failure ends. Here, we study
the mean of RSi as a metric representing the severity of cascading failures, which
P
can be calculated as E[RSi ] = N
j=1 limt→∞ pij (t)(Fj − Fi )/Fi . (For this metric to be
meaningful the initial number of failures Fi must be small, which in general is met in

most real scenarios.) Figures 4.19 and 4.20 show that E[RSi ] (for Fi = 3) increases
with r, e and θ. From results in Fig. 4.19 we observe that there is a critical value of
load-shedding constraint level (approximately θ = 0.2) above which strong cascading
behavior is observed. Furthermore, this trend becomes more evident and aggressive
as the capacity estimation error e increases. Similarly, the results in Fig. 4.20 suggests
that there is a critical loading level (approximately r = 0.8) for which the rate of
change in E[RSi ] increases abruptly for all values of e. Here, we reiterate that the
N-1 criterion has been ensured in all loading levels of the power grid; therefore, the
initial contingency is assumed to have at least two initial failures.
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Figure 4.19: E[RSi ] for the IEEE 118-bus system as a function of load-shedding constraint
level θ and the capacity estimation error e for r = 0.7 and the initial state with Fi = 3 and
Cimax = 20MW.
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4.6

Summary and conclusions

We have developed a scalable and analytically tractable probabilistic model, termed
the stochastic abstract-state evolution (SASE) model, which describes the stochastic
dynamics of cascading failures using Markov chains. The state space of the SASE
model is a reduced, abstract state space extracted from the large space of all possible
power-grid states. The definition of the abstract states retains key physical attributes
of the power grid. We introduced absorbing states in the state space to model the
stable states of the system. In contrast to the models that are based on pure birthchains, the definition of the absorbing states in the state-space of the Markov chain
enables modeling of various blackout sizes in the system. We have formulated the
state-dependent transition rates associated with the SASE model in terms of key
operating characteristics of the power grid including the power-grid loading level,
the load-shedding constraint level and the capacity estimation error. The analysis of
the SASE model and its asymptotic behavior together enable determining the PMF
of the blackout size, the evolution of the blackout probability from a specific initial
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state, as well as assessing the severity of the cascading behavior as a function of
various operating settings of the power grid. The SASE model also enables the identification of critical regions of the space of key power-grid operating characteristics
for which severe cascading behavior may occur. A key insight provided by this model
is that the PMF of the blackout size has a heavy tail specifically when the grid is
operating under stress scenarios. We also identified the transition probabilities for
the Markov chain model, which result in power-law distribution for the blackout size.
Numerical results based on the analytical model and the power-system simulations
both indicate that the probability that cascading phenomenon terminates in a state
(cascade-stop probability) has a bowl-shape form as a function of number of failures
in the system. The importance of the bowl-shape function is that it results in the
heavily tail distribution for the blackout size and thus represents a condition for
the critical behavior in the system. To the best of our knowledge, this important
fact about the critical form for cascade-stop probability that leads to the heavy-tail
distribution for the blackout size was not known heretofore.
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Regeneration-based framework for
cascading failures
In Chapter 4, we introduced Markov chains with state-dependent transition probabilities as a strong tool to model cascading failures. In this chapter, we present
another probabilistic framework for modeling cascading failures based on regeneration theory, which similarly to the Markov chain model, provides a strong tool for
capturing the stochastic dynamics of cascading failures, albeit in a more general setting, as described next. Although exponential distribution for events (e.g., failures)
in power grids is a well-accepted assumption, the presented model in this chapter
is sufficiently general to capture an arbitrarily specified probability distribution for
the events in the system in a non-Markovian setting. Here, we formulate a general
regeneration-based framework for modeling the stochastic dynamics of cascading
failures in power grids. We also derive, as a special case, a systems of differential
equations describing the probability of the blackout for a power grid with Markovian settings using this framework, which supplements the analysis in Section 4.4.
Specifically, this framework provides an elegant approach for proving Theorem 4.4.1
describing the probability of reaching a blackout with a specified number of failures
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in a time interval.

5.1

Preliminaries

Similarly to the Markov-chain model, the presented framework in this chapter describes the stochastic dynamics of the system by a sequence of transitions among
the states of the system. Similarly to the SASE model, we define the state space of
this framework based on extracting a reduced abstraction of large-scale power grids
using a small number of aggregate state variables.
In this framework, we use the number of failed lines F and the maximum capacity
of the failed lines C max as the descriptor of the state of the power grid. We denote
the state of the power grid by Si = (Fi , Cimax ). Note that compared to the state
space introduced for the SASE model in Chapter 4 we do not consider the stability
parameter I as a state variable. This point simplifies the regeneration equations
introduced in this chapter. Meanwhile, we capture the effect of stability of certain
states through the probability of transiting out of states. In other words, the probability that transiting out of a state never occurs is equal to the cascade-stability
probability introduced in Chapter 4. As such, the states of this model are partially
absorbing, which we define to be states that when hit then the system will never
leave them with certain probability (cascade-stop probability).
The idea of regeneration is that the occurrence of an event regenerates, or stochastically replicates, the same problem albeit with new initial conditions. The problem
considered here is the characterization of the probability of reaching a blackout of an
arbitrary size in any time interval starting from an initial grid state. In our model,
the event that regenerates the problem is the first line failure in a power-grid state.
Before formulating this problem theoretically, let us review the failure events in the
system.
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In this dissertation, we assume at most a single failure occurs at any time instant
in the system. Recall from Chapter 4 that when a single line failure occurs in the
system with state Si = (Fi , Cimax ) then the state of the system changes in one of
the following ways. First, if the capacity of the newly failed line, Cf is larger than
u,max
u,max
u
u
Cimax then the new grid state becomes Si+1
= (Fi+1
, Ci+1
) where Ci+1
= Cf
u
w
and Fi+1
= Fi + 1. Second, if Cf ≤ Cimax then the new grid state becomes Si+1
=
w,max
w,max
w
w
(Fi+1
, Ci+1
) where Ci+1
= Cimax and Fi+1
= Fi + 1. Hence, we can categorize

the events that transpire after a line failure, starting from state Si = (Fi , Cimax ), into
two types. These categories of events are introduced to simplify the characterization
of the transition rates among the states as introduced in Chapter 4. Let Uj and
u

j
w
W represent the time of the transition of state Si to state Si+1
and to state Si+1
,
△

respectively. The subscripts of the first random variable is for j ∈ J , where J =
{j|Cf = Cj , Cj ∈ C and Cj > Cimax }.
The key point in the regeneration-based model is to define a certain special ran△

dom variable, called the regeneration time, τ , defined as τ = minj {Uj , W }, which
represents the time to the first failure, or equivalently, the time of transition to a new
state. To reiterate, the key feature of the event at time τ is that its occurrence will
regenerate the problem at τ , which has the same statistical properties and dynamics
as the original problem but with different initial configurations, viz., different number of failures with possibly different maximum capacity of the failed lines. Next, we
present the general regeneration-based framework for the introduced problem.

5.2

Regeneration-based formulation

Similarly to Chapter 4, we use the notation B(t, M|Si ) to represent the probability of
reaching blackout size M or larger (a blackout with M or more line failures) in a time
interval t and initial grid state Si = (Fi , Cimax ). We denote the probability density
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function (pdf) of τ by fτ (s). In the non-Markovian setting fτ (s) can follow arbitrarily
specified probability distributions. Note that when Fi ≥ M then B(t, M|Si ) = 1.
This is because the state has at least M failures and the probability of reaching a
blackout state of size M or larger is one. Now, we consider the case Fi < M and
state the general integral equations describing B(t, M|Si ) in Theorem 5.2.1.
Theorem 5.2.1. The probability of reaching a blackout of size M or larger in a
time interval t and from an initial state Si = (Fi , Cimax ), where Fi < M and the
probability distribution of events in the system follows an arbitrary distribution fτ (s)
can be characterized by the following differential equation:
Z t
B(t, M|Si ) = (1 − Pstop (Si ))
P{Eτ = W |τ = s}B(t − s, M|S w )
0

X
uj
+ P{Eτ = Uj |τ = s}B(t − s, M|S ) fτ (s)ds,

(5.1)

j∈J

with the following initial conditions:
B(t, M|Si ) = 1, if Fi ≥ M.

(5.2)

Next, we present the proof of Theorem 5.2.1.
Proof. By exploiting the properties of conditional expectations we can write,
Z t
B(t, M|Si ) = (1 − Pstop (Si ))
B(t, M|Si , τ = s)fτ (s)ds.
(5.3)
0

Note that B(t, M|Si , τ = s) is the probability of reaching a blackout with at least M
failures in the time interval t conditioning on τ being equal to s (first event occurs
at s). We write this probability as
B(t, M|Si , τ = s) = P{Eτ = W |τ = s}B(t, M|Si , τ = s, Eτ = W )
X
+ P{Eτ = Uj |τ = s}B(t, M|Si , τ = s, Eτ = Uj ),
j∈J

(5.4)
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where Et represents the category of the event that occurred at time t. The conditional probabilities in (5.4) for the event {Eτ = Uj } can be written as follows, which
represents the regeneration of a new problem with new initial conditions.
B(t, M|Si , τ = s, Eτ = Uj ) = B(t − s, M|S uj ).

(5.5)

The new problem that has been regenerated based on (5.5) is the characterization of
the probability of reaching a blackout of size M or large in a time interval with length
t − s and the initial power-grid state as S uj . Similarly, we can write B(t, M|Si , τ =
s, Eτ = W ) = B(t − s, M|S w ). The proof of the regeneration equation of (5.5) is
similar to the approach presented in [84]. Substituting (5.5) in (5.4) and substituting
the result in (5.3) completes the proof.
The general framework presented in this section describes a system of integral
equations, where for each state Si as the initial state we have an equation in the
form of (5.1). We have to solve this system of coupled equations simultaneously in
order to numerically calculate B(t, M|Si ).

5.3

Regeneration-based formulation with Markov
property

As a special case of the general framework presented in Theorem 5.2.1, in this section,
we derive the closed form differential equations for B(t, M|Si ) when fτ (s) has Markov
property (i.e., follows an exponential distribution). The discussion here based on the
framework presented in Section 5.2 leads to the proof of Theorem 4.4.1.
Assume that random variables Uj and W are mutually independent and follow an
exponential distribution with parameters (inverse of the mean) γUj and γW , respectively. As mentioned in Chapter 4, we assume that γUj and γW are state dependent
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and also depend on the operating characteristics of the grid. If we assume that random variables in the system are independently and identically distributed following
exponential distribution (i.e., having Markov property) then this implies that the
minimum of these random variables is also an exponential random variable. As such,
P
τ is also an exponential random variable with rate γ = j∈J γUj + γW . Further,

P{Eτ = W |τ = s} = γW /γ, and P{Eτ = Uj |τ = s} = γUj /γ. Based on our discussion

in Section 4.3, γW represents the transition rate among the states corresponding to
(1 − Phc (Si )) (probability that a new failure in the system has a smaller or equal
capacity compared to the current Cimax ) and γUj represents the transition rate among
the states corresponding to Phc (Si )PC max (Si , S uj ), (where PC max (Si , S uj ) represents
the probability of transiting to state S uj with larger capacity compared to Cimax ).
For completeness we restate Theorem 4.4.1, which describes B(t, M|Si ) using a
system of differential equations.
Theorem 4.4.1 The probability of reaching a blackout of size M or larger in a
time interval t and from an initial state Si (with Fi < M) and fτ (s) following
an exponential distribution is characterized by the following system of differential
equation:


dB(t, M|Si )
= −γB(t, M|Si ) + (1 − Pstop (Si )) γW B(t, M|S w )
dt

X
uj
+
γUj B(t, M|S ) ,
j

(5.6)

with the following initial conditions:

B(t, M|Si ) = 1, if Fi ≥ M.

(5.7)
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Proof. Following the steps presented for the proof of Theorem 5.2.1, we can write
Z t
B(t, M|Si ) = (1 − Pstop (Si ))
γW B(t − s, M|S W )
 0
X
+
γUj B(t − s, M|S uj ) e−γs ds.
(5.8)
j∈C

Now, by using the Leibnitz integral rule and change of variables in (5.8), we can
derive (5.6).
Because the probability of reaching a blackout for a power-grid state Si is exu

j
pressed based on the probability of reaching a blackout starting form states Si+1
and

w
Si+1
, we have a set of coupled differential equations which must be solved simulta-

neously to obtain the numerical results for B(t, M|Si ).

5.4

Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, we presented a probabilistic regeneration-based framework for the
stochastic dynamics of cascading failures in power grids. This general framework is
applicable to more general settings where the system variables can be non-Markovian
random variables. Similarly to the Markov-chain model, the state space of this framework is defined based on extracting a reduced abstraction of large-scale power grids
using a small number of aggregate state variables. In this chapter, we first formulated a general regeneration-based framework for modeling the stochastic dynamics
of cascading failures in power grids. Then, as a special case, we derived the system of differential equations based on the general regeneration-based framework,
describing the probability of the blackout for a power grid in a Markovian setting.
The discussions in this chapter supplement the analysis in Section 4.4 describing the
probability of reaching a blackout with a specified number of failures in a time interval. The regeneration-based approach presented in this chapter is sufficiently general
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to capture the stochastic dynamics of cascading failures in systems with arbitrary
distribution for the random events in the system.
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Interdependent Markov chain
framework for cascading failures
In this chapter, we present an extension of the Markov chain model presented in
Chapter 4 to a novel interdependent Markov chain framework for modeling cascading failures in interdependent infrastructures. The interdependent Markov chain
approach proposed in this chapter provides a probabilistic framework to capture the
effects of interdependencies among physical systems on stochastic dynamics of the
interdependent infrastructure. The idea of this general approach is to build an integrated framework consisting of a system of interdependent heterogeneous Markov
chains, one for each physical system. In this chapter, we consider discrete time
Markov chains as it simplifies the modeling of the interaction between interdependent
systems by characterizing the transition probabilities of the interdependent Markov
chain based on individual chains. Here, we first present the general interdependent
Markov chain framework in Section 6.1. Then, we derive an interdependent Markov
chain model for cascading failures in electric-cyber infrastructures in Section 6.3. A
key insight obtained from the interdependent Markov chain model for the power grid
and the communication system is that interdependencies between the two systems
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can make two reliable systems behave unreliably, thereby increasing the probability
of large failures. For instance, we specifically show that two individual systems with
exponential distribution for the size of failures can be coupled together to have a
power-law distribution for the size of failures in an interdependent setting.

6.1

Interdependent Markov chains

In this section, we propose interdependent heterogeneous Markov chains to model
stochastic dynamics of cascading failures in a collection of systems comprising interdependent physical infrastructures. To do so, starting from individual Markov chains
that approximate the stochastic dynamics of each of the physical systems, we develop
a minimal Markov chain that encompasses the individual chains and approximates
the stochastic dynamics of the entire collection of systems as a single system while
capturing the interdependencies among the systems.

6.1.1

Preliminaries

We describe the interdependent Markov chain approach using two interdependent
systems A and B with the understanding that the same approach can be applied
to any finite number of interdependent systems. Here, we consider a Markov chain
for each of the physical systems similar to the one presented in Fig. 4.14. We have
shown the Markov chains of systems A and B in Fig. 6.1. Note that in Fig. 6.1 a
transition to the same state has been added to the model compared to Fig. 4.14 in
order to simplify the modeling of interdependencies between the Markov chains. The
model presented in Fig. 6.1 can be simplified to the one in Fig. 4.14 by adjusting the
transition probabilities. In these Markov chains the state of the system is denoted
by the number of failures and the stability variable as SiA = (FiA , IiA ) for system A
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and SiB = (FiB , IiB ) for system B. The state-space of the Markov chain for system
A is denoted by SA , where SA = {1, . . . , mA } × {absorbing, non-absorbing} and mA
is the number of components in system A. Similarly, we denote the state space of
the Markov chain for system B by SB = {1, . . . , mB } × {absorbing, non-absorbing}.
Notice that in general the state space of the Markov chains representing different
physical systems are not the same, neither is their cardinality nor their state variables.
The random process X(t) and Y (t) respectively represent the state of the system A
and B at time t ≥ 0.

Figure 6.1: Two Markov chains representing the stochastic dynamics of cascading failures
in each of the interdependent physical systems and the coupling effect between Markov
chains.

Clearly, the most naı̈ve way to couple two Markov chains is to develop a combined
Markov chain with the state space SC formed by the Cartesian product of the state
space of each of the individual systems, i.e., SC = SA × SB . With this approach,

105

Chapter 6. Interdependent Markov chain framework for cascading failures
we denote the state of the system comprising system A and B at time instant i
by SiC = (FiA , IiA , FiB , IiB ). Transition probabilities of the combined Markov chain
depend on the state of both of the individual systems.
This approach, however, has the shortcoming that the new transition probabilities
among the states of SC cannot be readily derived from the transition probabilities
of the individual Markov chains. A more serious flaw of this approach is that it
is based on the false and built-in assumption that combining two Markov chains
results in a new Markov chain with its state space being the Cartesian product of
the individual chains. In actuality, even if we assume that marginal processes X
and Y are Markovian it does not necessarily imply that their joint process (X, Y ),
as defined above, is Markovian. To verify this point we present the following simple
example. Let X1 , X2 , ... be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence.
Next, we define the process Yn as Yn = Xn−1 + Xn−2 for n > 2 and Y2 = Y1 = X1 .The
process Yn is Markov because
P{Yn |Yn−1, ..., Y1 } = P{Xn−1 + Xn−2 |Xn−2 + Xn−3 , ..., X1 } =
P{Xn−1 + Xn−2 |Xn−2 + Xn−3 } =

P{Yn |Yn−1},
(6.1)

where the step before last follows from the i.i.d. property of the sequence Xn . Therefore, both X and Y individually have the Markovian property. However, their joint
distribution does not have the Markovian property because
P{Yn , Xn |Yn−1 , ..., Y1 , Xn−1, ..., X1 }=P{Xn−1 + Xn−2 , Xn |Xn−2 + Xn−3 , ..., X1 , Xn−1 , ..., X1 }
= P{Xn−1 + Xn−2 , Xn |Xn−2 + Xn−3 , Xn−1 , Xn−2 }
= P{Yn , Xn |Yn−1 , Xn−1 , Xn−2}.

(6.2)

The extra term Xn−2 in the last line cannot be dropped, as Yn is not independent
of Xn−1 , Xn−2 , and Yn−1 due to their common terms, denying the joint distribution
of X and Y of being Markovian. In general, if the random process X(t) and Y (t)
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represent the state of the system A and B, respectively, then the interdependencies
between the two systems will result in correlation between processes X and Y .
Moreover, as the definition of interdependent systems implies stochastic dynamics of each of the systems is affected by the dynamics of the other systems. As such,
the one-step transitions in the whole system can be generally dependent on multiple
previous transitions (past dynamics or multiple-step history) of its constituent subsystems A and B. As a result, defining the new state space simply by the Cartesian
product of the state space of each system does not provide sufficient information
to fully capture the interdependency between the systems and to characterize the
transition probabilities among the states of the combined Markov chain. Hence, in
modeling interdependent systems, besides the knowledge from the current state of
each of the systems, we also need to incorporate memory from the past transitions
to adequately characterize the stochastic dynamics of the whole system.

6.1.2

State space and transition probabilities

We denote the probability of transiting to state sC
i+1 ∈ SC conditional on all the
C
C
C
C
history of the transitions for the system by fSi+1
C |S C ,...,S C (s
i+1 |si , ..., s1 ) , P{Si+1 =
1
i
C
C
C
C
C
sC
i+1 |Si = si , ..., S1 = s1 }, where si represents the current state of the system

and the remainder variables represent all the states that the system has visited in
the past. Let us assume that for each a ∈ SC , fSi+1
C |S C ,...,S C (a|·, . . . , ·) is a one-to1
i
one function on (SC )i . When a system exhibits the Markovian property, we have
fS C |S C ,...,S C (sC |sC , ..., sC ) = P{S C = sC |S C = sC } ≡ f˜S C |S C (sC |sC ). In this
i+1

i

1

i+1

i

1

i+1

i+1

i

i

i+1

i

i+1

i

i
case, the function fSi+1
C |S C ,...,S C (a|·, . . . , ·) cannot be one-to-one in general on (SC )
i
1

since it maps all different history sequences with the same current state to the same
C
C
C
value. In contrast, when we consider M-step memory then fSi+1
C |S C ,...,S C (s
i+1 |si , ..., s1 ) =
1
i
C
C
C
C
C
C
˜ C |S C ,...,S C
(a|sC
P{Si+1
= sC
i , ..., si−M +1 ).
i+1 |Si = si , ..., Si−M +1 = si−M +1 } ≡ fSi+1
i
i−M +1
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In this case, the function f˜Si+1
C |S C ,...,S C
(a|·, ..., ·) can be one-to-one on (SC )M . For
i
i−M +1
further discussion on, for example, the two-step Markov point processes we refer the
reader to [85]. The incorporation of memory in the model beyond one step provides
a mean for capturing the detail of dynamics of the system that is required to fully
capturing the interdependencies between the two systems.
As we pointed in the previous section, stochastic dynamics of system A and B
generally depends upon the M1 -step and M2 -step memory from the system B and
A, respectively. For simplicity of notation and without loss of generality, we assume
that M1 = M2 = M. The standard Markov chains are assumed to have one state
memory (namely 1-step memory). To capture the effects of the M-step memory for
each of the systems in stochastic dynamics of the combined system, the transition
probability function must be
f : (SC )M × SC → [0, 1],

(6.3)

where (SC )M captures the information from the current state (1-step memory) as
well as the previous M-1 states. The last SC in the domain of transition probability
function f captures the destination space of transitions.
In summary, the transitions among the states of the SC are not independent
of the past transitions of the system. To build the equivalent Markov chain for
the finite state machine with the state space SC and transition probabilities that are
functions of the previous states of the system, we need to extend the state space SC to
incorporate the memory of the past states. For instance, to build an interdependent
Markov chain while capturing M-step memory the state-space can be defined as
SI = (SA × SB )M . Due to the embedded memory in the definition of the states the
size of the state space SI can be prohibitively large in general. Next, we introduce
a quantization approach to reduce the size of the state space while capturing the
memory. Finally, note that the interdependent Markov chain with the state space
SI can be reduced to the combined Markov chain with the state space SC at the cost
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of losing the detail of interaction between the systems.

6.1.3

Memory quantization

In this section, we introduce a memory quantization approach for reducing the size
of the state space of the interdependent Markov chains. In this approach, we quantize the information about the history of the dynamics of the system by defining
equivalence classes of behaviors for the dynamics. For instance, if we can conjecture
that the system is stable or unstable based on the history of its dynamics then we
can categorize the history of the dynamics of the system into two classes of behaviors. We denote the set of behavior classes for the system by HI , for which in this
example, it is given by HI = {stable, unstable}. We define a quantization function
as g : (SA × SB )M → HI , where HI is the range of g. The function g compresses the
memory from the past into equivalence classes. Clearly, the most detailed HI is when
we exactly know the previous M-steps of the system, i.e., HI = (SA × SB )M . Note
that a quantization function can also be employed for classification of the individual
system’s behaviors. If we use function g to quantize the memory instead of the Mstep detailed memory then we can represent the state space of the interdependent
Markov chain by SI = HI × (SA × SB ), which can significantly reduce the size of SI .

6.1.4

Capturing the impact of interdependencies

Recall that modeling interactions among interdependent systems requires the knowledge of the behavior of the two systems. Up to this point we have discussed how to
capture the knowledge about the behavior of each of the systems in the model. The
next step is to determine how a specific behavior of a system affects the behavior
of the other system. At a coarse level, the effects of the behavior of a system on
another system can be divided into three categories: (1) improve, (2) worsen, and
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(3) do not change. In the Markov-chain framework presented in Fig. 6.1, these effects
can be translated into: (1) reducing the probability of extra failures, (2) increasing
the probability of extra failures, and (3) not changing the probabilities. Therefore,
the effects of interdependencies can be captured in the transition probability function f in (6.3), which can associate such effects with the transition probabilities in
the combined system using the knowledge of the current state as well as the past
dynamics of the system. Note that the effects of interdependencies may be constant
in time (homogeneous) but it may change depending on the state of the system.

6.1.5

Interdependency strength

We define the strength of interdependency between two systems based on two factors: (1) how much the knowledge of the behavior of a system affects the dynamics
of the other system (e.g., the absolute value of change in transition probabilities),
and (2) how much memory of the states of each system is required to capture the
interdependency effects on the other system. For instance, we define a metric δ to
measure the first factor as follows:
δ=

sup

n

|P{Xi+1 = xi+1 |Xi = xi }−

xi ,xi+1 ∈SA ,yj ∈SB ,i−M +1≤j≤i

o
P{Xi+1 = xi+1 |Xi = xi , Yi = yi , ..., Yi−M +1 = Yi−M +1}| .

(6.4)

In (6.4) metric δ characterizes the maximum influence of the behavior of system B
on system A. Note that when δ is large the interdependency is strong and when
it is zero it implies that the two systems are not interdependent. To measure the
second factor, we introduce K as the smallest integer j such that for all n and for
i > j, Xn and Yn−i are independent. Here, K is the minimum memory required to
be included in the interdependent Markov chain to capture the interdependencies
between the two systems. Note that when K is large the interdependency is strong.
K = 0 means that the knowledge of the current state of system A and B would
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be enough in modeling the interdependencies. In this case, K = −1 represents the
scenario in which the systems are not interdependent.

6.2

Interleaving approach

In this section, we present a new perspective in modeling the interdependent systems
using the interdependent Markov chain approach, which enables us to see the “cause
and effect” of interactions between the systems more clearly. In order to clarify
the interactions between the systems we propose an interleaving approach, which
captures the effects of every single transition in a physical subsystem on the other
physical subsystem right after it occurs. In other words, when a transition occurs
in system A then we need to evaluate how system B transits as a result of the new
transition in system A before more transitions occur in system A. Note that the
transition in system B due to the new transition in system A can even be transiting
back to the current state of system B (no change in the state of system B) when
the new failure has no impact on system B. This is the reason we introduced the
transition back to the state itself in the model presented in Fig. 6.1 compared to
Fig. 4.14. Following the above discussion, we can assume that the two systems
take turns in changing their states. In Fig. 6.1, we have represented the back and
forth mechanism (cause and effect model), which represents this assumption. Every
transition in Fig. 6.1 represented with a solid arrow will be followed by a transition
represented with a dashed arrow and vice versa. We call this approach interleaving
as it interleaves the transitions in system A and B in an order as is shown in Fig. 6.1.
The interleaving approach simplifies the modeling of interdependencies between the
systems by capturing the immediate effects of each transition on the other system.
Moreover, the interleaving approach adds an extra level of detail to the general
interdependent Markov chain model introduced in Section 6.1. We explain this point
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by the following example. Consider an interdependent Markov chain model with twostep memory, which is partially shown in Fig. 6.2. Note that we have only shown
the number of failures in each system and we have assumed that the other state
variable I equals to zero for both of the systems (we have considered non-absorbing
states). In this example, we observe that in the sequence of transitions a failure in
system A is followed by two failures in system B and again a failure in system A.
Here, the effects of individual failures in system B on system A is not clear. For
instance, one can conjecture that the first failure made system A vulnerable and
the second failure added an extra level of vulnerability and resulted in the extra
failure in system A. Further, one can also conjecture that the first failure did not
have any effect on system A and the second failure was the only reason for the extra
failure. This implies that the interdependent Markov chain model can capture the
combined effects while the interleaving approach can break the combined effects into
more detailed cause and effect scenarios. Note that the interleaved model can be
reduced to the original interdependent Markov chain framework if we aggregate the
effects by allowing multiple transitions in a subsystem.

Figure 6.2: An example of sequence of transitions in an interdependent Markov chain model
with two-step memory. In this example, we have only considered non-absorbing states.

All the definitions for the interdependent Markov chain model presented in Section 6.1 are valid for the interleaving framework. The only difference is the assumption of the back-and-forth mechanism for modeling the interdependencies. This
assumption only affects the definition of the state space. In other words, in order
to keep track of the transition turns we require an auxiliary variable, for instance, a
binary variable for two interdependent systems, which increases the size of the state
space by two. We have provided an example of the interleaving approach for the
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interdependent power and communication infrastructures in the next section.

6.3

An interdependent Markov chain model for
cascading failures in electric-cyber infrastructures

In this section, we develop an interdependent Markov chain framework based on the
interleaving approach, introduced in Section 6.1, for modeling cascading failures in
interdependent power and communication infrastructures. As described in Chapters
1-3, the available historical data and simulation results both suggest that the power
system and the communication network are interdependent infrastructures. While
such interdependencies can increase the reliability and efficiency of both systems, it
can also increase the risk of failures in the individual systems. In this dissertation, we
consider the interdependencies that lead to propagation of failures between the two
systems. Considering such interdependencies are specifically important in analyzing
the reliability of the whole system.

6.3.1

Individual Markov chains

In this section, we refer to the power system by System A and the communication
system by System B. We consider the Markov chains represented in Fig. 6.1 and
assume that they represent the stochastic dynamics of power and communication
infrastructures individually. To simplify the notation, we represent the number of
failures in the power grid, i.e., F A , and in the communication system, i.e., F B , by
the variables x and y, respectively. Further, we denote the probability of transiting
to a stable power-grid state in Markov chain A with p(x), i.e., p(x) = Pstop (x),
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where Pstop (x) is the cascade-stop probability as a function of number of failures in
the system as introduced in Chapter 4. Also, in the Markov chain representing the
communication system, we denote the probability of transiting to a state with an
extra failure in the communication network by q(y). We wish to reiterate that based
on our discussions in Chapter 4, the state-dependent transition probabilities are key
in modeling various stochastic behaviors for the system. Thus the state dependent
p(x) and q(y) enable us to study various behaviors for the individual systems as well
as the whole system.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the first failure occurs in the power
grid. We also assume that cascading failures terminate only when no more failures
occur in the power grid. Therefore, only the Markov chain representing the power
grid has the absorbing states. Moreover, we assume that an extra failure in the
communication system may occur only if a failure has occurred in the power grid in
the last transition. This means that we assume that the communication system is
more reliable than the power grid and that the cascading failure phenomenon grows
faster in the power grid. This is a reasonable assumption based the historical data
for cascading failures [4]. The above assumptions enable us to simplify the Markov
chains in Fig. 6.1 to the ones represented in Fig. 6.3.
Before moving to the next section to build the interdependent Markov chain
model, consider the case where we study the interdependent systems by studying
their Markov chains individually, while capturing the effects of the interdependencies
in the transition probabilities of each of the Markov chains separately. An example
of the latter approach is the SASE model presented in Chapter 4. Specifically, this
approach can consider a general description of communication system (without its
dynamics) and embed the effects of the description (e.g., operating characteristics θ
and e) in the transition probabilities of the power system. As another example, we
may describe the state of the communication system by “efficient” or “inefficient”
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Figure 6.3: The individual Markov chains of the power grid and the communication system
and the coupling effect between them in an interdependent electric-cyber infrastructure.

based on certain operating characteristics such as θ and e. Then, we can study
the Markov chain of the power grid with transition probabilities determined by the
knowledge of efficient or inefficient communication system. This is a special case of
the interdependent Markov chain approach, in which one of the Markov chains is
maximally compressed to have a state space of size one.

6.3.2

State space of the interdependent Markov chain

Here, we use the interleaving approach for coupling the individual Markov chains representing stochastic dynamics of cascading failures in electric-cyber infrastructures.
As discussed in Section 6.1.2, the state space of the interdependent Markov chains
should contain the state of both of the systems SA × SB as well as the memory of
the past transitions. The information from the past transitions enables us to identify
if a system is behaving stable or unstable. We assume that when the communica-
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tion system becomes less stable by experiencing a new failure then the power-grid
becomes vulnerable to extra failures. Also, when the power grid becomes less stable
due to a new failure then it may trigger an extra failure in the communication system. The above discussion explains the dynamic behavior of each system in terms
of the last transition in the whole system. As such, we need to capture at least the
last transition in the system to capture the effect of interdependencies. Therefore,
we assume that the minimum memory required to capture the dynamic behavior of
the system is two-step memory, i.e., K = 2 (the history consist of the current state
plus the previous state of the system). Hence, the state space of the interdependent
Markov chain is SI = (SA × SB )2 . However, due to the assumption of a single failure
at a time in the system, many states are not allowed to be the previous state for the
system. This reduces the size of the state space to 4(NA × NB ), where N represent
the cardinality of the state space. As the interleaving approach suggests, we also
need an auxiliary variable to keep track of the transition turns in the system, which
will double the size of the state space to SI = 8(NA × NB ). The concept of interleaving Markov chain for the power grid and the communication system is shown in
Fig. 6.3 is depicted in Fig. 6.4.
In summary, we define the state of the new interdependent Markov chain at
discrete time n by Sn = (Xn , In , Yn , Ln , Mn ) where, Xn and In are the state variables
of the power grid and Yn is the state of the communication system. We have also
introduced two auxiliary variables Ln and Mn in the definition of the states. Here,
L = 0 and L = 1 indicate that the last failure occurred in the power grid and the
communication system, respectively. As such the first auxiliary variable L captures
the ‘transition turn’ in the interleaving framework. The variable Mn captures the
memory of the dynamics by indicating whether any component failed in the last
transition. In other words, the dynamic memory quantization function g introduced
in Section 6.1.3 maps the history of dynamics to H ={new failure, no new failure}.

116

Chapter 6. Interdependent Markov chain framework for cascading failures

Figure 6.4: The concept of interleaving approach for coupling the Markov chains of the
power grid and the communication system in Fig. 6.3 is depicted by interleaving the communication states among power-grid states.

6.3.3

Transition probabilities of the interdependent Markov
chain

To characterize the interdependencies between the power and communication systems, we need to define how the behavior of a system affects the behavior of the
other system. Here, we characterize the transition probabilities of the interdependent Markov chain based on the transition probabilities of the individual Markov
chains and the interdependencies between the two systems. First, we define a function that captures the dependency of the power grid on the communication system.
We denote such function by d : {0, 1, 2, ..., m1} × {0, 1, 2, ..., m2} → [0, 1], where m1
and m2 denote the number of components in power and communication systems,
respectively. If the failure in the communication system does not affect the power
grid then d(., .) = 1, and when the failure of communication component results in
a failure in the power grid deterministically then d(., .) = 0. The closer the value
of d(., .) to zero the more it reduces the cascade-stop probability of the power grid.
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As such d modifies transition probabilities for the power grid based on the dynamics
of the communication chain. Further, we assume that transition probabilities of the
communication system do not change due to failures in the power grid. However, the
interleaving approach explicitly implies that only failures in the power grid can trigger
an extra failure in the communication system. Thus, we can assume that failures in
the power grid also change the transition probabilities in the communication system.
Based on the above assumptions, we define the transition probability from a random state Sn = (Xn , In , Yn , Ln , Mn ) to state Sn+1 = (Xn+1 , In+1 , Yn+1, Ln+1 , Mn+1 )
at discrete time instance n as follows.
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f (Sn+1|Sn ) =



p(Xn )d(Xn ,Yn )


1 − Mn +d(X
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p(Xn )d(Xn ,Yn )



Mn +d(Xn ,Yn )(1−Mn )















 0

In = 1
Ln+1 = Ln
In = In+1 = 0,
Ln = 0, Xn+1 = Xn
Yn+1 = Yn + 1,
In = In+1 = 0,
Ln = 0, Xn+1 = Xn
(6.5)

Yn+1 = Yn ,
In = In+1 = 0,
Ln = 1, Yn+1 = Yn ,
Xn+1 = Xn + 1
In = 0, In+1 = 1
Ln = 1, Yn+1 = Yn ,
Xn+1 = Xn
otherwise.

Based on the above discussion we can calculate the strength of interdependency based
on the definition of δ in (6.4) for these two systems as δ =

max

p(xn )d(xn , yn ).

xn ∈SA ,yn ∈SB

To clarify the interdependent Markov chain model for the power and communication systems, a portion of the Markov chain with transition probabilities among
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the states is shown in Fig. 6.5. Although the size of the state-space in this example
is in the order of Cartesian product of the individual spaces, which can be large, but
we can analyze this Markov chain using difference equations as presented in the next
section.

Figure 6.5: Portion of the interdependent Markov chain model for the power and communication system with transition probabilities among the states.

6.3.4

Analysis of the interdependent Markov chain

In this section, we derive a system of difference equations describing stochastic dynamics of the interdependent Markov chain presented for the interdependent power
and communication system in Section 6.3. We introduce PI (s) as the asymptotic
probability of reaching to state s ∈ SI from the initial state I ∈ SI . In our analysis,
we are interested in the probability of reaching to stable states in the power grid
in which cascading failures terminate (i.e., s̃ = (x, 1, y, 0, 0)). We denote PI (s̃) by
F (x, y). We also define ŝ = (x, 0, y, 0, 1) and denote PI (ŝ) by G(x, y). In the analysis
presented in this section, we assume that function d depends only on the state of the
communication system. Based on the structure of the interdependent Markov chain
model presented in Section 6.3 and following the steps in Appendix B, we derive a
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system of difference equations for F (x, y) and G(x, y) as stated in Theorem 6.3.1.
Here, we assume that p(.), q(.) and d(.) functions are nonzero at every point to avoid
the undefined expressions.

Theorem 6.3.1.

F (x, y) = α1 (x, y)F (x − 1, y) + α2 (x, y)F (x − 1, y − 1)
+ α3 (x, y)G(x − 1, y − 1),
G(x, y) = α4 (x, y)F (x − 1, y) + α5 (x, y)G(x − 1, y − 1).

(6.6)

The boundary conditions for this set of difference equations are

F (x0 , y0 ) = (1 − q(y0 ))p(x0 ),
F (x0 , y0 + 1) = q(y0 )p(x0 )d(y0 + 1),
G(x0 , y0 ) = 1.
(6.7)

In addition, F (x, y) and G(x, y) are equal to zero for the cases where x < x0 or
y < y0 . Moreover, F (x, y) = 0 when y > x.
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The coefficients in (6.6) are given by for the general case:
p(x)(1 − q(y))(1 − p(x − 1))
,
p(x − 1)
p(x)d(y)q(y − 1)(1 − p(x − 1)d(y − 1))
α2 (x, y) =
p(x − 1)d(y − 1)

α1 (x, y) =

α3 (x, y) = (1 − q(y − 1))p(x)d(y)q(y − 1)
(1 − p(x − 1)) −

(1 − p(x − 1)d(y − 1)) 
d(y − 1)

+ q(y − 1)p(x)(1 − q(y))(1 − d(y))
α4 (x, y) =

(1 − p(x − 1))
,
p(x − 1)

α5 (x, y) = q(y − 1) (1 − p(x − 1)d(y))
d(y)p(x − 1)(1 − p(x − 1)) 
.
−
p(x − 1)

(6.8)

The coefficients are different as following for three special cases:
First–The case where y = 1:
In this case α1 and α4 is same as (6.8) but
α2 (x, y) =

p(x)d(y)q(y − 1)(1 − p(x − 1))
p(x − 1)

α3 (x, y) = q(y − 1)p(x)(1 − q(y))(1 − d(y))
α5 (x, y) = 0.

(6.9)

Second–The case where y = x:
In this case all α values are zero except α2 , which is:
α2 (x, y) =

d(y)p(x)q(y − 1)(1 − p(x − 1)d(y − 1))
p(x − 1)d(y − 1)

Third–The case where y = x − 1:
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In this case the coefficients are as following:
p(x)(1 − q(y))(1 − p(x − 1)d(y))
,
p(x − 1)d(y)
p(x)d(y)q(y − 1)
α2 (x, y) =
,
p(x − 1)d(y − 1)
α1 (x, y) =

α3 (x, y) = (1−q(y−1))d(y)p(x)q(y−1)×

1
(1−p(x−1))−
,
d(y − 1)
(1 − p(x − 1))
,
α4 (x, y) =
p(x − 1)
α5 (x, y) = (1 − d(y))q(y − 1).

(6.11)

For proof see Appendix B.
The system of difference equations in (6.6) can be solved numerically using the
boundary conditions introduced in Theorem 6.3.1 in (6.7). The system of difference
equations in (6.6) enables the direct calculation of the probability of different size of
failures in each system.
We denote the probability of blackout with x failures in the power grid by Rp (x),
which can be written as
Rp (x) =

X

F (x, y).

(6.12)

0≤y≤x

Further, we denote the probability of y failures in the communication system by
Rc (y) as
Rc =

X

F (x, y).

(6.13)

y≤x≤N1

The time complexity of the numerical calculations of (6.6) is in the order of
the number of components in the system, which makes the model to be scalable
to large systems even though the analytical state space of the problem is large.
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This model enables the identification of different stochastic behaviors for the system
based on various state dependent transition probabilities for each system as well as
the introduced interdependency function.

6.4

Numerical results

In this section, we present the numerical results about the distribution of the failure
size in the interdependent power and communication systems based on the numerical
solutions of the system of difference equations in (6.6). We term a system, whose
distribution of the blackout size follows an exponential distribution, a reliable system
as the probability of large blackouts is small compared to the heavy-tail distribution.
We also term a system, whose distribution of the blackout size follows a heavytail distribution, such as the power-law distribution, an unreliable system. Using
the numerical results, we show that the interdependency between two systems can
introduce vulnerabilities in the whole system and increase the probability of large
blackouts. We specifically show that the interdependencies between two individually
reliable systems may lead to an unreliable coupled system.

6.4.1

Impact of interdependency on the distribution of the
blackout size

Here, we consider the IEEE 118 bus system for the power grid, which has 186 transmission lines. Without loss of generality, we assume that there are equal number
of components in the communication system, i.e., 186 communication components.
As described earlier in Chapter 4 when a Markov chain model (whose distribution
described by the difference equations in (4.18)), has constant (i.e., state independent) transition probabilities then the blackout size distribution is exponential. We

123

Chapter 6. Interdependent Markov chain framework for cascading failures
0

10

−5

10

−10

Probability

10

−15

10

−20

10

Single MC with constant p
Interdependnet MC with constant
p, q, and d

−25

10

Single MC with bowl−shape p(x)
−30

10

0

10

1

2

10

10

3

10

Number of failures, x

Figure 6.6: Probability mass function of the failure size in the power-grid in a log-log
scale for a reliable power system with exponential blackout distribution (the dashed line),
an unreliable power grid with power-law distribution (solid line) and an interdependent
Markov chain with constant p, q, and d in (a doted line).

also asserted that the bowl-shape function for the cascade-stop probability for the
Markov chain lead to a heavy-tail distribution for the blackout size. In particular,
special forms of the bowl-shape function for Pstop result in a power-law distribution of
the blackout size. The results presented in Fig. 6.6 represent the scenarios discusses
above. In summary, in Fig. 6.6, we have presented the PMF of the failure size for a
reliable power system with constant Pstop and exponential blackout distribution (the
dashed line), an unreliable power grid with bowl-shape form for Pstop and power-law
distribution of the failure size (solid line), and an interdependent Markov chain with
constant p, q and d in with exponential distribution for the failure size (a doted line).
Next, we assume that the Markov chain for the power grid has the specific bowlshape form for Pstop , that results in the power-law distribution for the blackout size.
This distribution is shown by solid line in a log-log scale in Fig. 6.7. Next, we use
the interdependent Markov chain model presented in Section 6.3 for the power and
communication systems to study how the interdependency between the two systems
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Figure 6.7: Probability mass function of the failure size in the power-grid in a log-log
scale for various scenarios of p(x), q(y), and d(y). The results are obtained based on the
interdependent Markov chain model and using (6.12) and (6.6).

affects the distribution of the blackout size in the power grid. The distribution of
the blackout size in the power grid, Rp is calculated using (6.12) and (6.6). As the
first example, we couple the Markov chain of the power grid with a Markov chain for
the communication system, which has constant transition probabilities. This means
that we have a reliable communication system. The results shown in the doted line
in Fig. 6.7 suggest that the interdependencies between the two systems increase the
probability of large blackouts and also preserve the heavy tail characteristic except at
the end. In other words, the blackout distribution for the power-grid Rp in this case
also follows the power-law distribution, but with a smaller parameter s. This means
that the probability of large blackouts increases as a result of the interdependency
between the two systems. The sharp increase at the end of the distribution represents
the critical behavior of the system, which increases the probability of larger blackouts
even more that other values. As the next example, we couple the Markov chain of
the power grid with a Markov chain for the communication system, which has the
bowl-shape function for the probability of no extra communication failures due to
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power-grid failures, i.e., (1−q(y)). The effect of an unreliable communication system
is more severe on the reliability of the system as is shown in a dashed line in Fig. 6.7.
In both of the interdependent examples presented here, the function d is assumed to
be constant and equal to 0.4.
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Figure 6.8: Probability mass function of the failure size in the communication system in a
log-log scale for various scenarios of p(x), q(y), and d(y). The results are obtained based
on the interdependent Markov chain model and using (6.13) and (6.6).

The distribution of the failure size in the communication system Rc , is calculated
using (6.13) and (6.6) and is presented in Fig. 6.8. In Fig. 6.8, we have presented
the distribution of failures in the communication system for various scenarios of
interdependencies with different p(x) and q(y). In these scenarios, the function d is
assumed to be constant and equal to 0.4. Similarly to the results in Fig. 6.7, the
results in Fig. 6.8 also suggest that the interdependencies increase the probability of
large failures. Specifically, when one of the systems are unreliable.
Figure 6.9 shows Rp when Pstop for the power grid follows the bowl-shape obtained
from the simulation results presented in Fig. 4.6. As discussed in Chapter 4, this
bowl-shape function for Pstop results in another heavy-tail distribution with a hump
near the tail of the distribution for the blackout size as shown in Fig. 6.9. The results
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presented in Fig. 6.9 indicate that the interdependencies between the communication
system and the power grid with constant q and d parameters increase the size of the
hump.
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Figure 6.9: Probability mass function of the failure size in the power grid when Pstop
has the bowl-shape form obtained from power-system simulations. The interdependencies
between the power and communication system increase the size of the hump.

6.4.2

Individually reliable systems can behave unreliably when
coupled

In the next study, we assume that we have two reliable systems with constant p(x)
and q(y). We couple the two reliable systems using the interdependent Markov
chain framework. In this study, we want to answer the following critical question:
can two coupled reliable systems form a single unreliable system? To answer this
question, we use the system of difference equations in (6.6) and assume that p and
q are constant. We want to find function d(y) such that the two reliable power and
communication systems, result in the power-law distribution for the blackout size.
To find such d(y), we input the probability of the blackout size in the power grid
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Figure 6.10: Probability mass function of the failure size in the power grid in an interdependent Markov chain model, when two reliable systems are coupled with interdependencies
that lead to unreliable behavior.
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Figure 6.11: The d(y) values that result in an unreliable behavior (power-law distribution)
for the two coupled reliable systems.

in (6.12) based on the power-law distribution introduced in (4.19), i.e., Rp (x) =
P (x, 1.1, m1) introduced in (4.19). This implies that we have a system of m1 nonlinear equations for d(y). We have solved this system of non-linear equations using
an optimization approach, which minimizes the distance between Rp (x) and the
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blackout size resulted from the system of difference equations, with the constraint
0 ≤ d(·) ≤ 1. In Fig. 6.10, we have shown the result of the distribution of the blackout
size in a system with 20 components when the individual systems are reliable but the
distribution of the failure size in the coupled power grid (dashed line) approximates
the power-law distribution. We have also represented the distribution of the failure
size when function d is constant (i.e., state independent) in the dark solid line,
which results in exponential distribution. The d(y) values that result in unreliable
behavior for the two reliable systems is presented in Fig. 6.11. The results in Fig. 6.11
suggest the d values, which result in the power-law distribution also exhibit the three
phase phenomenon observed in cascading failures, as described in Chapter 4. At the
beginning, one failure in the communication system does not alter the cascade-stop
probability but as the number of failures in the communication system increases
their impact on the cascade-stop probability increases and thus d becomes smaller.
The values of d rise again as the number of failures increases in the communication
system as well as the power grid and cascading failures phase out. Using the results
in Fig. 6.10, we showed that two individually reliable systems may behave unreliably
when coupled as a result of interdependency between the individual systems. This
important result confirms the importance of considering the interdependent systems
as a single system for reliability analysis.

6.5

Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, we presented a novel interdependent Markov chain framework for
modeling cascading failures in interdependent infrastructures. In this framework, we
start from individual Markov chains that approximate the stochastic dynamics of
each of the physical systems and developed a minimal Markov chain that encompasses the individual chains and approximates the stochastic dynamics of the entire
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collection of systems as a single system while capturing the interdependencies among
the systems. We presented the interdependent Markov chain framework in a general setting and then, as a specific example, derived an interdependent Markov chain
model for cascading failures in electric-cyber infrastructures. We studied various scenarios of reliable and unreliable systems to characterize the distribution of the failure
size in coupled systems. A key insight obtained from the interdependent Markovchain model is that interdependencies between two systems can make two reliable
systems behave unreliably when put together. For instance, we specifically showed
that certain interactions among the systems can result in the power-law distribution
for the size of failures in the coupled system when the two individual systems have
exponential distributions for the failure size.
There are a wide range of interesting problems that can be studied based on the
interdependent Markov chain framework. Examples of such problems are the analytical characterization of asymptotics of the interdependent Markov chain based on
asymptotics of the individual chains and analytical characterization of the interdependencies that lead to critical behaviors. The problems addressed in this chapter
are the ones that are relevant to the interdependent power and communication systems. Further analysis of the interdependent Markov chains and other examples are
extensions of this work and are out of scope of this dissertation.
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Chapter 7
Fundamental bounds on the
information rate in
information-centric power grids
In this chapter, we look at another aspect of smart grids, namely the information
exchange in the communication system of the power grid, which enables efficient
monitoring and control of the power grid. We develop an information-theoretic
framework for characterization of the exchange of information in the sensor network
that enables the monitoring of the power grid. Control rooms of power grids rely
heavily on accurate estimate of the state of the system. As such, large number
of sensors are employed in the power systems. The sensors collect samples of the
state of power-system components with high frequency. Nonetheless, exchange of
such state information from large number of sensors incurs a large communication
cost on the communication network of the power grid. The framework presented in
this chapter enables the characterization of the minimum required communication
capacity for the sensor network in smart grids by compressing the data by exploiting
the correlation among the data sources. In other words, the presented framework
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captures the interplay between the information rate and the correlation among the
state information of various components in the system.
In this chapter, we consider the sensor network that enables accurate state estimation of the power grid for monitoring and control purposes. In particular, we
assume that sensors are located on transmission lines and measure the temperature
and the power flow of the lines and update these information to the control center of
the system. Note that this is a specific example of the application of sensors in power
grids. Sensors can be employed to measure a wide range of attributes such as voltage,
frequency and phase at different points of the system. In this chapter, we characterize
the minimum information rate that the sensors need to update their information to
the control center in order to track the thermal state of the components accurately. In
other words, this study characterizes the minimum required communication capacity
for this specific application of sensor networks in power grids.
The presented framework in this chapter is based on a lossless distributed sourcecoding framework. While distributed source coding theory has been widely used
in sensor networks in the last decade, its utility has been limited to the context of
distributed sensing, which the signal of the interest is an environmental signal that is
independent of the system attributes [86]. Although tracking the state of components
in a system can be viewed as a distributed-sensing problem, the signal of interest
here is tied to the system characteristics, for example, power-flow distribution and
customer demands in the power grid. For instance, the temperature of the lines is
correlated with the power flow through the lines controlled and monitored by the
control center. In other words, the temperature of the lines depends on the power
distribution mechanism in the system and vice versa. In addition, the information
about the power-flow through the line is available both at the line and the control
center.
Here, the distributed source coding model may warrant extension or modifications
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to capture the information characteristics and their availability in various parts of
the system. In this research, we use the generality of distributed source coding
theory to characterize the minimum information rate required by the sensor nodes
communicating over the communication network to support accurate and real time
state information of transmission lines by exploiting the correlation among state
information of various lines. The model presented in this chapter provides a general
framework for characterization of the minimum required information rate in sensors
networks that sense correlated signals for which certain side information is available
at the source and the destination of the information exchange. In particular, we
have also applied this framework in the context of sensor networks with distributed
sensing and computing purposes [87].

7.1

Related work

Recently, information theory has been adopted for characterizing the control overhead (rate of information exchange for monitoring and control purposes) in distributed systems. The pioneering work presented by Gallager [88] is one of the
earliest contributions that used information theory in characterizing the network
overhead for tracking source and receiver addresses. In [89] and [90] the minimum
overhead of maintaining state information (link state and motion state, respectively)
to be used in routing protocols across a mobile ad hoc network is formulated as
a rate-distortion problem. The assumption in [89] and [90] is that the state information associated with various nodes/links are mutually independent; hence, the
rate-distortion formulation is considered for a single component. The authors of [91]
use rate-distortion theory to investigate the optimal timing for updating the bandwidth information of the links. In [92], the relation between network performance
and information rate is captured by extending the definition of distortion measure to
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capture network performance. All the models that are based on the rate distortion
theory are based on the assumption that certain amount of error in the estimation
of the state of components is acceptable.
All the aforementioned works consider point-to-point information theory in characterizing the interplay between the rate of information and distortion. Network
information theory [93], on the other hand, provides a strong tool for characterizing
the information exchange in a distributed fashion when there is correlation among
the state information of different sources. As mentioned in the previous section,
distributed source coding theory [86] has been widely used in sensor networks in
the last decade but its application has been limited to standard distributed sensing
problem. To the best of our knowledge, distributed source coding theory has not
been employed in studying the information rate in distributed systems for control
purposes, which the signal to be sensed is tied to the system attributes and the side
information is available at different points of the system.

7.2

Sensor model

Recall that we assume sensors collect information about the thermal state of powersystem transmission lines and update the information to the control center. We
assume that sensors form clusters consisting of a cluster head (CH) and a set of
geographically adjacent sensors. The sensors of each cluster update their temperature
data to CH. We further assume that the clusters communicate together and to the
control center over a communication network with lossless channels. We refer to the
sensor nodes located on transmission lines simply by the nodes.
Here, the problem of investigating the information rate of the sensor network is
broken down to the same problem for individual clusters of sensor nodes. Hence, we
will focus on one cluster hereafter with the understanding that the same procedure
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will be applied to all clusters of the sensor network.
We represent the n samples of the changes in the temperature of the transmission
lines by Xin = (Xi1 , Xi2 , . . . , Xin ). The reason to consider the changes in the temperature of transmission lines is to have independent samples in time. The changes
in the temperature of a transmission line is a function of the power flow through
the line and the environmental factors. If we assume that power flow changes due to
random changes in the customer demands and also environmental factors are random
and independent in time then the samples of temperature changes will be independent in time. However, the Xij values are correlated among different sensor nodes
of a cluster both due to the geographical proximity (the same environmental effects)
and correlation in the power flow data due to local changes in the customer demand
and the physics of the power flow in a region. We can write the dynamics of line
temperature changes as Xi = Yi + Ti where, Yi is the random thermal change due to
the power flow through the line and the Ti is the random thermal change due to the
environmental factors that affect the temperature. Thus dynamics of the temperature of a line is governed by the random variables associated with the environmental
factors and the power flow in the line.
We assume that sensors sample the state of the components at discrete time
instants called sampling instant. We further assume that at the update instant sensor
nodes send the state information to CH. We call the interval between two consecutive
update instants an update interval. We further assume that an update interval
consists of n sampling instants. Besides the temperature of the lines, we assume
that the power flow through the line is also measured at the n sampling instances.
The information about the power-flow through the line is also available at the control
center of the system. In the next section, based on the introduced assumptions we
develop a distributed source coding framework for exchanging information in which
the information about the power flow through the lines serves as the side information.

135

Chapter 7. Fundamental bounds on the information rate in information-centric power grids

7.3

Distributed source coding model

Assume that at each update instant node i uses its encoder to encode the samples of
the states i.e., Xin = (Xi1 , Xi2 , ..., Xin ) separately from other nodes and then sends
it to the CH. We call the information about the power flow, Yi s, the side information. We assume that the statistical characteristics of Xi and Yi are available.
The CH uses its decoder to decode and reconstruct the state of nodes using the
correlation among Xi s and the side information Yi s. Specifically, the reconstructed
state of node i is denoted by X̂in = (X̂i1 , X̂i2 , . . . , X̂in ) and the probability of error

(n)
is Pe , P (X̂1n , . . . , X̂Nn ) 6= (X1n , . . . , XNn ) . Figure 7.1-a illustrates this formula-

tion schematically for a cluster with N nodes. Our formulation is an extension of
Slepian-Wolf Theorem [94] to distributed lossless source coding with multiple side
information.
An N-tuple (R1 , . . . , RN ) is said to be achievable for distributed lossless source
(n)

coding if there exists a sequence of codes with these rates such that lim Pe
n→∞

= 0.

For the ease of reference and discussion of the theory, we define:
Formulation 1. A distributed source coding problem that does not use Yi s
and nor does it use the correlation among Xi s. This formulation is equivalent to N
separate Shannon’s lossless source coding problems.
Formulation 2. A distributed source coding problem that uses Yi s but it does
not use the correlation among Xi s. This formulation is equivalent to N conditional
lossless source coding problems (single source coding problem with side information
at the encoder and the decoder [93]).
Formulation 3. A distributed source coding problem that uses the correlation
among Xi s but it does not use Yi s. This formulation is a Slepian-Wolf problem.
Formulation 4. A distributed source coding problem that uses both Yi s and the
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(a)

(b)
Figure 7.1: (a) The proposed distributed source coding model with side information to
characterize the information rate in the sensor network of a power grid. (b) The achievable
rate region of the four formulations.

correlation among Xi s. This is our formulation in this research.
Note that Formulations 1 and 2 fall in the area of point-to-point information
theory.
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7.4

Characterizing the rate region

We begin the characterization of the rate region of Formulation 4 by considering
the distributed source coding model for a cluster with two nodes. The achievable
rate region of the formulations mentioned in the last section has been depicted in
Fig. 7.1-b. Note that in Fig. 7.1-b, we have shown the rate region of Formulations 2
and 3 in the special case when H(X1 |X2 ) < H(X1 |Y1 ) and H(X2|X1 ) < H(X2 |Y2 ),
where H(.|.) represents the conditional entropy. Characterization of the achievable
rate region of Formulation 3 has been presented by Slepian and Wolf in [94]. The
achievable rate region of Formulation 2 is also known [93].
Characterizing the achievable rate region of the Formulation 4 is straight forward
and can be explained as follows. Consider a special case in which there is only one
encoder that jointly encodes the state information of the two nodes while the CH
decodes the code for both sources using side information. In this case the outer
bound of the sum-rate, defined as R1 + R2 , for Formulation 4 can be written as
R1 + R2 ≥ H(X1 , X2 |Y1 , Y2). In general, however, this bound may not be achievable
since nodes are encoding the sources separately (this is why it is termed outer bound).
Now consider the case when nodes encode the sources separately while each node
having access to the other node’s state information. In this case, the rate of a node
should satisfy R1 ≥ H(X1 |X2 , Y1 , Y2 ) based on Formulation 2. Combining these
bounds results in the outer bound for the optimal rate region of Formulation 4,
which can easily be shown to be achievable and tight (with a proof similar to that
of the Slepian Wolf Theorem [95]) and therefore improves the lower bound on the
minimum information rates. Based on the above discussions, we present the rate
region of this framework for two nodes in Theorem 7.4.1 and for the general N nodes
in Theorem 7.4.2.
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Theorem 7.4.1. The optimal rate region for Formulation 4 with two nodes is

R1 ≥ H(X1 |X2 , Y1 , Y2),

(7.1)

R2 ≥ H(X2 |X1 , Y1, Y2 ) and
R1 + R2 ≥ H(X1 , X2 |Y1 , Y2).

For proof see Appendix C. Theorem 7.4.1 can be extended to an arbitrary number
of nodes in the cluster as follows.

Theorem 7.4.2. Let S ⊂ {1, 2, ..., N}. The optimal rate region for the problem in
Formulation 4 with N nodes is
X
j∈S


Rj ≥ H X(S)|X(S c ), Y (S ∪ S c )) ,

where S c represents the complement of the set S and X(S) is the set of Xi s for i ∈ S
and X(S c ) and Y (S ∪ S c ) are defined likewise.

We omit the proof of Theorem 7.4.2 since it is similar to that of Theorem 7.4.1.
Note that in this special case of the distributed source coding problem the rate
region of the framework depicted in Fig. 7.1-a would be the same as the one stated
by Theorems 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 even if the side information Yi s were only available at
the decoder. However, in lossy distributed source-coding problems these two cases
would result in different rate regions. The next point to note here is that the lower
bounds derived based on these approaches, are asymptotically achievable (as the
number of samples in an update interval goes to infinity, i.e., n → ∞); hence, they
provide bounds on the information rate of the sensor network [89–92].
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7.5

Numerical evaluation

Theorems 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 provide analytical expressions of the lower bound for the
minimum state information rate of nodes in a cluster. In this section, we consider a
specific example of a sensor network and provide the numerical results calculated for
the minimum information rate of the state estimation. For simplicity, we consider a
cluster with two nodes.
We discussed that the Yi s of different lines may be correlated due to the physics
of the power flow and customer demands. To model the dependency between Y1
and Y2 in our example we simply use Y1 = Y2 + ∆Y . In this model ∆Y affects the
correlation between Y1 and Y2 (and consequently the correlation between X1 and
X2 ). In a similar way, the correlation between Ti s can be modeled by T1 = T2 + ∆T .
Note that the correlation among Ti s also affect the correlation among Xi s. In our
example, we assume independent Poisson distributions for random variables with
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Figure 7.2: (a) State information rate of node 1, and (b) total control overhead (sum of
the rates of nodes) as a function of the dependency between X1 and Y1 .
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In our calculations, we have assumed λY2 = 4, λT2 = 3, and λ∆L = λ∆T = 1. Since
all the random variables have Poisson distributions, we can numerically calculate
the entropy, joint entropy and conditional entropy for different combination of the
presented random variables.
Figure 7.2-a depicts the minimum state-information rate of node 1 as a function of
λT1 , for Formulations 1, 2, and 4 calculated at points A, B, and D shown in Fig. 7.1b, respectively. In our calculations, we have only changed λT1 . From Fig. 7.2-a,
we observe that as the dependency between X1 and Y1 decreases the rate of node 1
increases. The sum of the rates of nodes (total control overhead) for the formulations
are calculated based on the sum-rate constraint in Theorem 4.1 and shown in Fig. 7.2b. Figure 7.2-b also shows that the sum of the pair of rates shown in Fig. 7.2-a equals
to the sum-rate constraint value calculated based on Theorem 4.1. This is due to
the special position of the selected pair of rates (in Fig. 7.1-b).
We next investigate the effect of correlation between X1 and X2 on the control
overhead. To see this effect in our example, we changed λ∆Y and λ∆T (we assume
λ∆Y = λ∆T ). The minimum state-information rate of node 1 for Formulation 3
(calculated at point C in Fig. 7.1-b) and Formulation 4 are represented in Fig. 7.3-a.
The minimum total control overhead for Formulation 3 and 4 are shown in Fig. 7.3-b.
Notably Formulation 4 provides the smallest lower bound among other formulations
for the minimum information rate of the nodes.

7.6

Summary and conclusions

In this chapter, we developed an information-theoretic framework for characterization of the minimum rate of information for the sensor network that enables the
monitoring of the power grid. This framework is based on distributed source coding
model that enables the characterization of the minimum rate of information exchange
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Figure 7.3: (a) State information rate of node 1, and (b) total control overhead (sum of
the rates of nodes) as a function of the dependency between X1 and X2 .

(minimum required capacity) in the communication network. The framework captures the interplay between the information rate and the correlation among the state
information of various components. Moreover, using the proposed framework we
presented an improved estimate of the lower bound for the minimum information
rate necessary to accurately describe the state of components in the system. This
improvement is achieved by exploiting the correlation among the state information
of components as well as the available side information in the system. The model
presented in this chapter provides a general framework for characterization of the
minimum required information rate in sensors networks, that sense signals for which
certain side information is available at the source and the destination of the information exchange.
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Chapter 8
Future work
Understanding complex cascading phenomena in critical infrastructures is crucial in
designing cascade-aware control mechanisms to ensure the resilience of infrastructures to large failures. The probabilistic frameworks presented in this dissertation
for modeling cascading failures in power grids and interdependent infrastructures
provide critical insight about the risk of blackouts and the factors affecting such
risk. These probabilistic models can provide predictive capabilities to infrastructure
operators to examine and analyze the risk of cascading failures as well as the critical
system settings that may severely affect the risk of large failures. In this dissertation, we tackled multiple challenging problems regarding modeling, predicting and
analyzing the risk of cascading failures and a number of interesting problems remain
for future work. In this chapter, we present an overview of future research problem
in this area.
Our simulation results presented in this dissertation suggest that the topological
and spatial distribution of failures affect cascading failures. Understanding how failures propagate in infrastructures and how the spatial distribution of failures and the
structure of the infrastructure affect the risk of failures is a future research problem.
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Capturing the effects of the distribution of failures and the structure of the system in
stochastic dynamics of cascading failures is also an extension of the work presented
here. Our research group at the University of New Mexico is currently working on
this problem. Also, we described that based on historical data human error plays
a key role in the cascading behavior of the system. Capturing the effects of human
error in characterization of the risk of large blackouts is another future work. Our
research group at the University of New Mexico in collaborations with Fraunhofer
USA Center for Sustainable Energy Systems is currently working on this problem as
an extension of the work presented in this dissertation. In general, there are a large
number of key factors in operating critical infrastructures that affect cascading failures. For instance, the available resources and use of microgrids in the distribution
network of power grids can largely affect the cascading behavior in smart grids of
the future by helping the system in mitigating the effects of contingencies. Although
the stochastic nature of the introduced models in this dissertation enables capturing
the effects of factors affecting cascading failures indirectly into the predictions of the
risk of large failures, embedding such information directly in the model can improve
the predictive capability of the model.
In addition, a key outcome of the presented probabilistic models in this dissertation is a roadmap for the identification of critical sub-regions of the parameter space
of the system, corresponding to various severity levels of cascading behavior. Theoretical characterization of such critical regions allow for separation of the cascading
behavior from non-cascading behavior in critical infrastructures. For instance, in this
dissertation, we identified the bowl-shape function for the probability that cascading
failures terminate, which leads to heavy tail in the distribution of the failure size.
Studying the conditions that lead to high probability of failures in complex systems
such as critical infrastructures using analytical approaches is another area of future
work.
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Further, as a future work, the theory developed in this dissertation, specifically
the interdependent Markov chain model, can be extended for modeling cascading failures in other complex interdependent systems. Also, further analysis of the asymptotics of the interdependent Markov chain based on asymptotics of the individual
chains and analytical characterization of the interdependencies that lead to critical
behaviors are interesting problems to be investigated. Specifically, the interdependent Markov chain framework can be used to analytically characterize conditions
that individually reliable systems may behave unreliably due to interdependencies
with other systems. Additionally, as a future work, the introduced regenerationbased framework for modeling cascading failures can be used to derive the dynamics
of complex systems with non-Markovian characteristics.
The information-theoretic model presented in this dissertation for characterizing
the minimum information rate in sensor networks provides a general framework. It
can be customized for various applications in which the rate of information exchange
needs to be characterized in scenarios with correlated sources of information and
available side information that are tied to the performance metrics of the system.
Furthermore, this general framework can be extended using distributed lossy source
coding framework to appropriate cases in which certain amount of error in the data
to be tracked is acceptable.
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Appendix A
Derivation of equation (4.5)
We start by defining the following events: (1) Estop , which is the event that cascadestop transition occurs, (2) EFi , which is the event that the power grid has Fi failures,
and (3) ECimax , which is the event that the maximum capacity of the failed lines in the
power grid is Cimax . Note that Pstop (Si ) is the conditional probability P{Estop |EFi ∩
ECimax }. Next, we use the simple approach used in [82], in conjunction with certain
reasonable assumptions to approximately represent P{Estop |EFi ∩ ECimax } in terms of
a weighted superposition of P{Estop |EFi } and P{Estop |ECimax }. We begin by noting
that multiple application of Bayes rule yields
P{Estop |EFi ∩ ECimax }=

P{Estop ∩ EFi }P{ECimax |Estop ∩ EFi }
.
P{EFi ∩ ECimax }

(A.1)

Using the representation in (A.1) we can write
P{Estop |EFi ∩ ECimax } = P{Estop |EFi }

P{ECimax |Estop ∩ EFi }
.
P{ECimax |EFi )

(A.2)

With a similar approach, we can also write
P{Estop |EFi ∩ ECimax } = P{Estop |ECimax }
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P{EFi |Estop ∩ ECimax }
.
P (EFi |ECimax }

(A.3)

Appendix A. Derivation of equation (4.5)
Now using (A.2) and (A.3), we can write
P{ECimax |Estop ∩ EFi }
P{ECimax |EFi }
P{EFi |Estop ∩ ECimax }
,
+(1 − w)P{Estop |ECimax }
P (EFi |ECimax }

P{Estop |EFi ∩ ECimax } = wP{Estop |EFi }

(A.4)

where w ∈ [0, 1]. In this dissertation, P{Estop |EFi } and P{Estop |ECimax } are denoted
(1)

(2)

by Pstop (Fi ) and Pstop (Cimax ), respectively.
Next, we assume that the dependence of the event ECimax on the event Estop is
weaker than the dependence of the event ECimax on the event EFi , which implies that
P{ECimax |Estop ∩ EFi } ≈ P{ECimax |EFi }. This simplifying assumption can be justified
from the physical characteristics of power grids. Based on our simulation results, we
know that given that Fi is large, there is a high probability that Cimax is also large; on
the other hand, when Fi is small then the probability of having large Cimax is small.
For example, when Fi is large the probability of high capacity line failures increases
due to high stress on the system and the large ratio of the number of high capacity
lines to the total number of lines in the system. Therefore, although the knowledge
of event Estop adds information about the occurrence of the event ECimax we assume
that it does not significantly alter the probability distribution of the event ECimax
given EFi . Similarly to the previous assumption, we assume that the dependence of
the event EFi on the event Estop is weaker than the dependence of the event EFi on
the event ECimax . Hence, when Cimax is small then the probability of Fi being large
is small and Estop does not alter this probability significantly. These assumptions
enable us to approximate (A.4) by (4.5).
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Proof of Theorem 6.3.1
For simplicity of notation, we denote the asymptotic probability of reaching a state,
say s = (x, i, y, m, ℓ), from the initial state I by P(x, i, y, m, ℓ).
Based on the structure of the interdependent Markov chain model introduced in
Section 6.3, which is partially shown in Fig. 6.5, as well as the transition probabilities
introduced in (6.5), we write P(x, 1, y, 0, 0) based on the asymptotic probabilities of
reaching to its previous states as
P(x, 1, y, 0, 0) = p(x)PI (x, 0, y, 1, 0) + p(x)d(y)P(x, 0, y, 1, 1),
= p(x)(1 − q(y))P(x, 0, y, 0, 1) + p(x)d(y)q(y)P(x, 0, y − 1, 0, 1)

= p(x)(1 − q(y)) (1 − p(x − 1))P(x − 1, 0, y, 1, 0)

+ (1 − p(x − 1)d(y)P(x − 1, 0, y, 1, 1))

+ p(x)d(y)q(y) (1 − p(x − 1))P(x − 1, 0, y − 1, 1, 0)

+ (1 − p(x − 1)d(y − 1))P(x − 1, 0, y − 1, 1, 1) ,

(B.1)

where in the first line P(x, 1, y, 0, 0) has been written based on the probability of
reaching to its two possible previous states and the second line is derived by writing
the probabilities in the first line based on their possible previous states and similarly
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for the next step. This means that we have written P(x, 1, y, 0, 0) based on the
asymptotic probabilities of reaching to its three-step past states. We also know that
P(x − 1, 1, y, 0, 0) = p(x − 1)P(x − 1, 0, y, 1, 0) + p(x − 1)d(y)P(x − 1, 0, y, 1, 1),
(B.2)
and similarly,
P(x − 1, 1, y − 1, 0, 0) = p(x − 1)P(x − 1, 0, y − 1, 1, 0)
+ p(x − 1)d(y − 1)P(x − 1, 0, y − 1, 1, 1).

(B.3)

Now, if we substitute (B.2) and (B.3) in (B.1) then we have

P(x, 1, y, 0, 0) = p(x)(1 − q(y)) (1 − p(x − 1)) P(x − 1, 1, y, 0, 1)

− p(x − 1)d(y)P(x − 1, 0, y, 1, 1) /p(x)

+ (1 − p(x − 1)d(y)P(x − 1, 0, y, 1, 1))

+ p(x)d(y)q(y) (1 − p(x − 1))P(x − 1, 0, y − 1, 1, 0)
+ (1 − p(x − 1)d(y − 1)) P(x − 1, 1, y − 1, 0, 1)


− p(x − 1)P(x − 1, 0, y − 1, 1, 0) /(p(x)d(y − 1)) .

(B.4)

Next, we simplify (B.4) and substitute the definition of P(x − 1, 0, y − 1, 1, 0) and
P(x − 1, 0, y, 1, 1) based on P(x − 1, 0, y − 1, 0, 1) in (B.4). As mentioned in Chapter
6, we denote P(x, 1, y, 0, 0) by F (x, y) and P(x, 0, y, 0, 1) by G(x, y). As such, after
the simplifications of (B.4) we can write
F (x, y) = α1 (x, y)F (x − 1, y) + α2 (x, y)F (x − 1, y − 1)
+ α3 (x, y)G(x − 1, y − 1),
G(x, y) = α4 (x, y)F (x − 1, y) + α5 (x, y)G(x − 1, y − 1),

(B.5)

where its coefficients are functions of p(.), q(.) and d(.). This proves the general case
in Theorem 6.3.1. Based on the structure of the presented interdependent Markov
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chain model, there are three special cases that the coefficients do not follow the
general case presented in (6.8). This is because certain states do not have all the
previous states that we used in the derivation of the above difference equations. For
instance, when y = 1 the state s = (x − 1, 0, y − 1, 1, 1) in the above equations does
not have any previous state. Similarly, the cases where y = x and y = x − 1 need to
be considered as special cases due to the assumption that communication failures are
triggered by power failures and thus certain states are not possible as previous states.
This is because we cannot have more communication failures than power failures in
the system based on the assumptions of the model. The derivation of the difference
equations for special cases is similar to the general case and thus have been omitted
here.
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Proof of Theorem 7.4.1
Theorem 7.4.1 is an extension of Slepian-Wolf Theorem to the case with four sources
that two of them are co-located with the decoder and the other two are remote.
Similarly to [95], the proof of Theorem 7.4.1 consists of two parts. First, we show
that for the pair of rates in the region described in Theorem 7.4.1, there exists a
(n)

sequence of codes with lim Pe
n→∞

= 0 (the achievability proof). Next, we will show
(n)

that for every sequence of codes with lim Pe
n→∞

= 0 the rates satisfy the constraints

in Theorem 7.4.1 (the converse proof).
Achievability proof of Theorem 1: Here, we use random binning technique
[95], and the notion of typical sequences [93]. For X with a pmf pX (x) and ε ∈ (0, 1),
define the set of ε-typical n-sequences xn as

Tεn (X) = { xn : |π(x|xn ) − pX (x)| ≤ εp(x) for all x ∈ X },

where, π(x|xn ) = |{i : xi = x}|/n for x ∈ X , which X is the corresponding alphabet
of Xi ’s. The notion of typicality can be extended to multiple random variables. To
review of the properties of ε-typical sets see [93].
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Codebook generation. Randomly and independently assign an index m1 (xn1 )
to each sequence xn1 ∈ X1n according to a uniform pmf over [1 : 2nR1 ]. Sequences
with the same index mi form a bin B1 (mi ). We do the same for the second source.
The bin assignments are revealed to nodes and the CN.
Encoding. Upon observing xn1 ∈ B1 (m1 ), encoder 1 sends m1 . Similarly, for
xn2 ∈ B1 (m2 ), encoder 2 sends m2 .
Decoding. Given the received index pair (m1 , m2 ), the decoder declares (x̂n1 , x̂n2 )
to be the estimate of the sources if it is the unique pair in the product bin B1 (m1 ) ×
B2 (m2 ) such that (xn1 , xn2 , y1n, y2n ) is jointly typical; otherwise it declares an error.
Analysis of the probability of error. We bound the probability of error
averaged over bin assignments. Let M1 and M2 denote the random bin indices for
X1n and X2n , respectively. The decoder makes an error if and only if one or more of
the following events occur:
E1 = {(X1n , X2n , Y1n , Y2n ) ∈
/ Tεn },
E2 = {x̃n1 ∈ B1 (M1 )for some x̃n1 6= X1n , (x̃n1 , X2n , Y1n , Y2n ) ∈ Tεn},
E3 = {x̃n2 ∈ B2 (M2 )for some x̃n2 6= X2n , (x̃n2 , X1n , Y1n , Y2n ) ∈ Tεn},
E4 = {x̃n1 ∈ B1 (M1 ), x̃n2 ∈ B2 (M2 )
for some x̃n1 6= X1n , x̃n2 6= X2n , (x̃n1 , x̃n2 , Y1n , Y2n ) ∈ Tεn }.
Then by the union of events bound, the average probability of error is upper bounded
as
P{E} ≤ P{E1 } + P{E2 } + P{E3 } + P{E4 }.

(C.1)

Now, we bound each probability of error term. By the law of large numbers and
definition of ε-typical sets, P{E1 } tends to zero as n → ∞. For the second term,

153

Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 7.4.1
using symmetry of the codebook construction, we have

P{E2 |X1n ∈ B1 (1)}

X
=
p(X1n ,X2n ,Y1n ,Y2n ) ((xn1 , xn2 , y1n , y2n )|X1n ∈ B1 (1))×
n n n
(xn
1 ,x2 ,y1 ,y2 )

P{x̃n1 ∈ B1 (M1 ) for some x̃n1 6= X1n , (x̃n1 , X2n , Y1n , Y2n ) ∈ Tεn |

n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n n
x1 ∈ B1 (M1 ), (X1 , X2 , Y1 , Y2 ) = (x1 , x2 , y1 , y2 )}


X
X
n
n
n n
n
=
p(X1n ,X2n ,Y1n ,Y2n ) (x1 , x2 , y1 , y2 ) ×
P{x̃1 ∈ B1 (1)}
n n n
(xn
1 ,x2 ,y1 ,y2 )

n n n
n
x̃n
1 ∈Tε (X1 |x2 ,y1 ,y2 )

≤ 2n(H(X1 |X2 ,Y1 ,Y2 )+δ(ε)) 2−nR1 ,

(C.2)

which tends to zero as n → ∞ if R1 > H(X1|X2 , Y1, Y2 ) + δ(ε). Similarly, P{E3 }
and P{E4 } tend to zero as n → ∞ if R2 > H(X2 |X1 , Y1 , Y2 ) + δ(ε) and R1 + R2 >
H(X1 , X2 |Y1, Y2 ) + δ(ε). Therefore, there exists a sequence of bin assignments with
(n)

lim Pe

n→∞

= 0. This completes the achievability proof of the theorem.
(n)

Converse proof of Theorem 1: Given a sequence of codes with lim Pe
n→∞

= 0,

let K1 and K2 denote the indices from encoders 1 and 2, respectively. By Fano’s
inequality [93], we have

H(X1n |K1 , K2 , Y1n , Y2n ) ≤ H(X1n |X̂1n )
≤ 1 + nPe(n) log |X | = nεn ,
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(n)

where εn tends to zero as n → ∞ by the assumption that lim Pe
n→∞

= 0. Now

consider
nR1 ≥ H(K1 )

(C.4)

≥ H(K1 |K2 , Y1n , Y2n )
= H(K1 |K2 , Y1n , Y2n ) + H(X1n |K1 , K2 , Y1n , Y2n )
− H(X1n |K1 , K2 , Y1n , Y2n )
= H(X1n , K1 |K2 , Y1n , Y2n ) − H(X1n |K1 , K2 , Y1n , Y2n )
≥ H(X1n , K1 |K2 , Y1n , Y2n ) − nεn
= H(X1n |K2 , Y1n , Y2n ) − nεn
≥ H(X1n |X2n , K2 , Y1n , Y2n ) − nεn
= H(X1n , K2 |X2n , Y1n , Y2n ) − H(K2 |X2n , Y1n , Y2n ) − nεn
= H(X1n |X2n , Y1n , Y2n ) + H(K2|X1n , X2n , Y1n , Y2n ) − nεn
= nH(X1 |X2 , Y1 , Y2 ) − nεn .
Here, we have used H(A1 , A2 |A3 ) = H(A1 |A3 ) + H(A2 |A1 , A3 ), a property of the
conditional entropy, multiple times, where Ai ’s are arbitrary random variables. Now,
by taking n → ∞, we can conclude that R1 ≥ H(X1 |X2 , Y1 , Y2 ). This completes the
converse proof of Theorem 7.4.1.
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